董事連結及查核會計師連結對財務報導品質的影響──來自舞弊公司訴訟案件之證據

The Contagious Effect of Director Interlock and Auditor Interlock on Financial Reporting Quality: Evidence from the Lawsuits against Fraudulent Firms

本文旨在探討非舞弊公司與舞弊公司之間若存在重要關係人連結（董事連結及查核會計師連結）時，對非舞弊公司的財務報導品質是否會有不良的影響。實證結果發現，舞弊公司的財務報導品質確實較非舞弊公司為差，而當非舞弊公司與舞弊公司之間存有重要關係人連結時，其財務報導品質又較非舞弊公司與舞弊公司之間無任何連結者為差。若考量重要關係人連結的類型時，本文進一步發現負面財務報導品質外溢的效果大致上是來自獨立董事連結及查核會計師連結。再者，額外分析亦顯示上述負面資訊外溢效果亦會發生在非舞弊公司與舞弊公司之間存在著多種形態連結關係的情況。本文的研究發現對於關注改善財務報導品質的主管機關及利害關係人具有重要的參考價值。

This paper investigates the influence of director interlocks and auditor interlocks with fraudulent firms on financial reporting quality of a non-fraudulent firm. The empirical results find that the financial reporting quality of a fraudulent firm is worse than a non-fraudulent firm and the financial reporting quality of a non-fraudulent firm that interlocks with fraudulent firms is worse than that without such interlocks. When we consider the type of inter-firm interlock, further tests reveal that the contagious effect is broadly driven by independent director interlocks and auditor interlocks. Moreover, additional analysis indicates that the similar effect also can be found in the presence of multiple types of interlocks. Taken as a whole, our findings have corporate governance implications for regulators and stakeholders that aim to improve financial reporting quality.