英文摘要 |
This article revisits the reasons for institutionalism as a (practice-dependent) method of normative political theory by examining the similar debate on rights of secession. Seeing non-institutionalism (i.e. practice-independent approaches) as rival, institutionalists proclaims that theorists should prioritise using institutionalism because it can address epistemic uncertainty successfully, deliver complete and high feasible principles for action due to holistic reasoning, and avoid theorists’subject judgement. I argue that, learning from the methodological debate in secession theories, these three reasons all fail to support the claim. Theorists are not necessarily required to use institutionalism to construct normative political theories because, shown by non-institutionalists in secession theory, practice-independent methods can address epistemic uncertainty. Also, holistic reasoning is unnecessary for political theory given that the idea of institutional concept is context dependent. Institutionalism does not even demand high feasibility but just makes sure the principles compatible with extant practices. Non-institutionalism would not deny such compatibility for regulative principles. Non-institutionalists could also counter the charge of subject judgement by conforming to the inevitability, the moral threshold, and the consequentialist conditions. Finally, the problems of moral remainder and status bias often taint institutionalism, making theorists hesitant to prioritise the method for theorising. |