少數股權的剝奪與股利政策：台灣資本市場的新發現

Expropriation of Minority Shareholders and Dividend Policy: New Evidence from Taiwan

本研究發現，公司治理和股權結構在企業股利政策的制定過程中呈現互補作用。藉由動態追蹤資料迴歸模型的分析，本研究探討企業的股利政策是否遵循La Porta等人（2000）提出的股利替代模型，亦即公司的股利政策受到過去的股利政策及未來的現金增資計劃之影響。當公司計畫未來發行新股籌措資金時，公司治理較薄弱的企業比公司治理較良好的企業有較高的股利發放率。本研究採用控制權的董事會席位（BSCR）對表決權（VR）的比率（BSCR/VR）來衡量具控制權股東與外部股東之間潛在的代理問題。發現以下三個結論。首先，公司治理良好的企業比公司治理薄弱的企業具有較高的股利發放率。此外，非家族式企業的股利發放率會高於家族式企業。最後，在未來有現金增資計劃的情形下，公司治理薄弱的企業，其股利發放將高於公司治理良好的企業。

This paper finds that the corporate governance and ownership structure play complementary roles to each other as companies are making dividend policies. Using a dynamic panel data regression model, we investigate whether a firm’s dividend payout is affected by past dividend payout as well as future equity financing that is suggested by the dividend substitute model (La Porta et al., 2000). When firms plan on issuing additional equities in the future, weak corporate governance firms have higher dividend payouts than do strong corporate governance firms. This paper introduces the board seats of controlling rights (BSCR) to the voting rights (VR) ratio as the proxy to measure the potential for agency conflict between controlling and outside shareholders. We find that ownership structure can better describe the relationship between dividend payout and the potential for agency conflict than corporate governance ranking. The dividend payouts of Non-Family firms are affected by the potential for agency conflict, but not affected by last year’s dividend payouts. However, the dividend payouts of Family firms are affected by last year’s dividend payouts, but not affected by the potential for agency conflict.