策略型及利他型的企業環境責任在綠色市場的表現

Strategic and Altruistic Corporate Environmental Responsibility in a Green Market

這篇文章探討策略型及利他型的企業環境責任對一個涵蓋市場的影響，而此市場的消費者在乎綠色產品的品質。所謂策略型的企業環境責任意指廠商從事自願的環境友善行動（如，改善產品的綠色品質）時，只在乎利益的極大化追求;而利他型的企業環境責任則意指廠商的目標不只為利潤，也企盼能極小化整體的環境損害。我們從所建構的雙佔產品差異化模型中發現，當廠商只具有策略型或少量利他的企業環境責任時，只有高品質的廠商會改善其產品的綠色品質，此時的整體環境品質會低於社會最適的水準。當廠商的利他逐漸增加，高低品質廠商皆會改善其產品的綠色品質，甚至有可能使整體環境品質高於社會最適。當兩個廠商都自願投入其品質的改善時，低品質廠商的利潤會隨著它自己的利他程度而增加，而高品質廠商反而會隨著其利他的程度而降低。此外，廠商具有企業環境責任時的社會福利無論如何皆會低於社會最適的水準。

We investigate the impact of firms’strategic and altruistic corporate environmental responsibility (CER) engagement on a covered market where consumers care about green quality. Define a firm as engaging in strategic (altruistic) CER if it executes voluntary environmental actions by seeking profit maximization (both profit maximization and environmental damage minimization). In a duopoly vertical product differentiation model, we find that when firms engage in pure strategic or sparsely altruistic CER, only the greener firm invests in green quality. The environment is less protected because both firms’optimal green quality levels are below the social optimum. When firms’aggregate altruistic CER engagement rises to a certain level, the less green firm also invests in green quality. The environment is may be over-protected when the firms’optimal green quality levels are above the social optimum. Interestingly, the profit of the less green firm rises with its altruistic CER, which implies that embracing environmental concerns does not sacrifice its profit. Finally, when firms engage in CER, social welfare in the market equilibrium is unambiguously lower than the social optimum.