萬年董事會與內部控制缺失之關聯性

The Over-Tenured Board and Internal Control Deficiencies

本文旨在探討萬年董事會對內控缺失之影響。以2003-2016年台灣公開發行以上公司為研究樣本，實證結果發現隨著董事會任期增長，公司發生內控缺失的可能性下降，然而當任期增長到一定程度之後，反而增加發生內控缺失的可能。進一步分析發現，前述監督無效的結果主要來自一般董事的任期，獨立董事則可能因獨立董事制度實施時間不夠長，他們的任期尚未長到開始發生監督無效的狀況。此外，在董事會運作較佳或較高需求董事經驗價值之情境，研究結果依舊支持萬年董事會監督無效。最後，在監督效力的轉折分析上，本文發現轉折點發生在第四個任期，當董事會任期超過四個任期後，發生重大內控缺失的可能性顯著較高。整體而言，萬年董事會在內部控制上監督效力較低。

This study aims to examine the effect of over-tenured boards on internal control deficiencies. Using 2003-2016 Taiwanese public companies as the sample, the results show that the likelihood of internal control deficiencies decreases with the average tenure of the board of directors, but increases with the over-tenured board, suggesting that over-tenured boards are ineffective in supervision. This result is mainly driven by the tenure of general directors, not by the tenure of independent directors. We attribute this phenomenon to the possibility that the independent director system has not been implemented long enough to cause ineffective supervision by independent directors. In addition, using the contexts of better operations for corporate boards or higher demand for directors' experience value, the results still support that over-tenured boards increase the likelihood of internal control deficiencies. Finally, this study finds that tenure of at least 12 years is the turning point at which monitoring effectiveness may begin to suffer. Overall, the over-tenured board has lower monitoring effectiveness on internal control.