月旦知識庫
 
  1. 熱門:
 
首頁 臺灣期刊   法律   公行政治   醫事相關   財經   社會學   教育   其他 大陸期刊   核心   重要期刊 DOI文章
東吳哲學學報 本站僅提供期刊文獻檢索。
  【月旦知識庫】是否收錄該篇全文,敬請【登入】查詢為準。
最新【購點活動】


篇名
思想實驗的知態工程
並列篇名
The Epistemic Task of Thought Experimentation
作者 侯維之
中文摘要
反例式思想實驗是用以顯示某個形上學必然論題為假,就如何證立哲學論題,本文探究思想實驗對哲學理論化的正面知態角色。運用思想實驗的直覺判斷(Øψ1)以反駁給定論題,在於此論題滿足了後述形式要求:Ifφisψ, then ifφ1 (/ψ1), one can see in a non-empirical way thatψ1 (/φ1), whereφ1 andψ1 are instances ofφandψ, respectively。除了論證深層理解(deep understanding)無法證立哲學論題,本文基於形式要求的滿足,討論可行的策咯:逆推考量(the Abduction)與實用考量(the Pragmatic)。二個策略都無法提供直接證成,而只能是相較於競爭對手的合理選擇;此外,本文論證為何實用考量,才能最佳說明思想實驗對於哲學理論化的知態貢獻。
英文摘要
Counterexample thought experiments (hereafter thought experiments) are the usual way to show false some philosophical theses that are proposed as necessarily true. This paper explores a positive epistemic role for thought experiments in philosophical theorising. At least in most cases, the rationale of employing the intuitive judgement of a thought experiment, say,Øψ1, against a target thesis is that it satisfies the formal requirement of the Non-empirical Instance: Ifφisψ, then ifφ1 (/ψ1), one can see in a non-empirical way thatψ1 (/φ1), whereφ1 andψ1 are instances ofφandψ, respectively (section I). This paper shows why deep understanding (or general intuition) does not do any non-empirical justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses (section II). It then analyses the two most promising strategies for non-empirical justification: the Abduction and the Pragmatic (sections III & IV). These strategies involve adopting a weaker notion of intuition that is suitable for judging particular thought experiment cases non-empirically. The non-empirical justification they render to (most) substantive philosophical theses can be put as follows: Given the presupposition that a substantive philosophical thesis can be defended successfully against thought experimentation, such a thesis is only justified non-empirically in that it is rational to choose it, in contrast to its rivals, because it deals with relevant thoughtful challenges better. This paper presents a reason why general intuitions should not do essential justificatory work to support substantive philosophical theses by analysing the positive role of thought experimentation (section V).
起訖頁 105-125
關鍵詞 反例式思想實驗逆推考量實用考量思想實驗法哲學理論化counterexample thought experimentthe abductive considerationthe pragmatic considerationthought experimentationphilosophical theorisation
刊名 東吳哲學學報  
期數 202312 (47期)
出版單位 東吳大學
該期刊-上一篇 規約型vs.意圖型的話語施事行為:「話語施事失能」如何可能?
該期刊-下一篇 對真實性別的質問
 

新書閱讀



最新影音


優惠活動




讀者服務專線:+886-2-23756688 傳真:+886-2-23318496
地址:臺北市館前路28 號 7 樓 客服信箱
Copyright © 元照出版 All rights reserved. 版權所有,禁止轉貼節錄