英文摘要 |
With the growing interest in the studies of Qi in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the theories of Qi proposed by Wang Tingxiang and Dai Zhen’s have garnered academic attention. Both Wang and Dai were critical of Song Confucianism, particularly Zhu Xi’s dualism of metaphysical Li and physical Qi. They rejected the notion that Li transcends Qi ontologically. Instead, they considered Qi as the ontologically first-order concept and argued that Li serves as the pattern and order of Qi. However, Wang and Dai diverged in their understanding of human nature. Wang suggested that human nature encompasses both goodness and badness, while Dai reinterpreted Mencius’notion of innate goodness. Concerning the relationship between the Li and natural desires, Wang adopted a position of strict moralism, arguing that the cultivation of virtues begins with purifying one’s thoughts, suppressing desires, or even eliminating them. In contrast, Dai suggested that satisfying desires is necessary for the practice of morality. In this paper, the author aims to approach this topic by 1) highlighting the shared criticism of Wang and Dai towards Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the operation of Li in understanding human nature, 2) identifying the discrepancies between Wang’s argument on the duality of human nature and Dai’s perspective on the innate goodness of human nature, and 3) discussing whether Wang or Dai could contend adequately with the moral aspect of human nature on the basis of their studies of Qi and effectively continue the Confucian teaching of realizing virtues. |