主體與工夫：論牟宗三對祁克果哲學的批判

Subjectivity and Cultivation: On Mou Zongsan’s critiques of Søren Kierkegaard’s philosophy

一方面，牟宗三先生稱許祁克果是繼康德後，又有一個突出的人物。另一方面，牟宗三批評，祁克果受基督教傳統影響僅足以表示宗教歸依，未能進入心性內部以正面實踐道德。這批判有兩層意思。第一層是「未能積極說明心性之骨幹」的批評：祁克果未能說明真實主體性的理論根據。第二層是「未能進入心性內部以正面實現超轉」的批評：祁克果未能說明挺立真實主體性的實踐工夫。本文旨在闡明祁克果哲學中的「激情」概念，藉此回應牟宗三的批評。祁克果區分三種「激情」，它們分別是三層主體性的根據：「關注的激情」引發審美階段的主體性；「自身反思的激情」開顯倫理階段的主體性；「信仰的激情」建立宗教階段的主體性。信仰的激情不純然是依宗教情緒而論主體性，信仰的激情要求信仰者透過反思了解自身能力，憑藉實踐認清能力的限制，再進而立志突破自身能力的限制。即使主體信仰耶穌基督，但主體絕非完全虛位以待。相反，主體立志仿傚基督，內化基督精神於內心，成為一名真正的基督徒。可見，「激情」概念確立主體性的理論根據和實踐工夫，祁克果哲學未有牟宗三所批評的「說理」和「踐仁」困難。

Mou Zongsan admires Søren Kierkegaard as an outstanding thinker in the post-Kantian era. However, Mou also criticizes that Kierkegaard fails to explain the theoretical ground of true subjectivity and the practical cultivation of true subjectivity. This paper aims to refute Mou’s criticisms. Firstly, it argues that Kierkegaard’s notions of passion, e.g., the passion of interest, the passion of irony and the passion of faith, are the theoretical grounds of subjectivity in the esthetic stage, the ethical stage, and the religious stage respectively. Secondly, it argues that the passion of faith in the religious stage motivates the practical cultivation of true subjectivity. Once a subject recognizes his finitude and wants to break through it, the passion of faith motivates him to become a Christian by internalizing the Christian spirit.