英文摘要 |
This paper examines the relationship between regime type and energy subsidies, including pre-tax and tax subsidies, and discusses how these relationships are mediated by the degree of inflation. The paper suggests that the logic of political survival and the costs of energy subsidies are two of the main factors shaping energy subsidy policies. Pre-tax subsidies require the government to budget for part of the cost, which is not easy for the government to avoid. Since authoritarian regimes prioritize social stability, they spend more on pre-tax fuel subsidies than democracies. Dealing with the externality of energy commodities is less important for political survival than keeping the price of basic goods affordable. Moreover, the costs of providing tax subsidies can be passed on to future generations. Political leaders in both regimes are more willing to provide these subsidies. However, the decision to provide energy subsidies is also related to the level of inflation, as high inflation often preventing a country from reforming subsidies. Democratic governments tend to provide less pre-tax subsidies even when inflation is high because they have to bear more of the public’s financial costs. In contrast, tax subsidies are a cost that will only be borne by future generations, so governments are under less financial pressure to provide them. The subsidy behaviors of the two regimes are similar under this condition. These findings clearly show that, regardless of inflation, democracies provide less pre-tax energy subsidies than authoritarian regimes, and they also provide less tax subsidies given low levels of inflation. |