地方政府的行政實踐與國家制度之間的衝突及重塑──以晚清吉林將軍雙城堡民界的出現為例

Conflict and Reform in Local Government Administrative Practices and Central Government Institutions: The Emergence of the Minjie in Shuangchengpu during the Late Qing Dynasty

本文以晚清東北封禁政策變化之初端，即吉林將軍雙城堡民界的產生為例，論述了地方政府的行政實踐與國家制度相互塑造的過程。乾隆四十二年（1777），清廷開始對東北升科民地徵收懲罰性賦稅。嘉慶二十年（1815）雙城堡旗人移墾後，由於旗界的收入無法支付地方政府的辦公費，吉林將軍富俊違反清廷的民人政策，以較輕租額吸引入丁陳氏以官佃的身分，攜眷佃種官地，主要包括公租地、恆產地、隨缺地。富俊通過種種途徑迫使清廷接受這一轉變，從而在雙城堡形成民界，其租賦制度改革，對清末東北的開禁政策產生重要影響。通過對民界的考察，發現地方官員違反制度的現象是普遍存在的。不過，一般情況下，這種背離的幅度是有限的，典章制度的威懾作用依然存在。然而，如果一些制度成為地方社會發展的巨大障礙，地方官亦會創設新的行政慣例，消解國家制度對地方社會的影響。新的地方政策，在地方政府與國家的博奕中產生，典章制度的變遷，可能就始於這種微小的積累。由此可見，地方政府的行政實踐與國家制度之間充滿了矛盾，在激烈的碰撞中相互塑造。

In this article, we look at the emergence of the minjie (civilian lands) in Jilin's Shuangchengpu region and the beginning of changes to the late Qing dynasty ban on Chinese immigration to the Northeast, outlining the process of the mutual formation of local government administrative practices and central government institutions. From 1777 on, the Qing court began to levy fines on the cultivation of civilian land in the Northeast. But, beginning in 1815, after the settlement of Shuangchengpu, the income from banner lands in that area proved insufficient to support the cost of running the local government. As a result, the Jilin governor, Fu Jun, defied Qing court policy, using lower rents to attract civilian settlers to lease official lands (especially those classified as gongzu, hengchan, and suique lands) and become tenants. By various means, Fu Jun was able to force the Qing court to accept this change in its policy and thereby establish a minjie in Shuangchengpu. This institutional tax reform had a major impact on the lifting of the Northeast immigration ban in late Qing China. In this article, we examine civil administrative practices in Shuangchengpu and find that the local government there frequently violated imperial regulations. However, in most cases, these violations were limited in scale, and imperial regulations still retained authority. All the same, we suggest that when institutional regulations formed by the central government proved a hindrance to the development of local society, local magistrates would institute new administrative practices so as to diffuse the effect of these regulations. Thus, new local policies came into being as a result of the struggles between local governments and central institutions, and subsequent changes in imperial institutional and legal practice might have originated from the accumulation of minor changes caused by these struggles. Local governments and central government institutions often had contradictory agendas, and, in the sometimes intense collisions that occurred between the two, change and adaptation was a mutually reinforcing process.