| 英文摘要 |
In a paper read before the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Far Eastern Association at Washington D.C., in 1955, I made this statement: ''Neo-Confucianism is, in fact, a type of empiricism in which the term 'experience' has a wider scope than in what we ordinarily understand as empiricism.'' We find substantiation of it in the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung and Ming periods, in the philosophy of Liu Chi-shan and Huang Li-chou who continued the tradition of the philosophy of mind, and also in the philosophies of Wang Ch'uan-shan, Yen Hsi-chai, Li Shu-ku, and Tai Tung-yüan who in their various ways reacted vehemently to both the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of principle. None of these philosophers, however, had any inkling beyond the narrow confines of moral empiricism, a view just as partial and distorting as modern scientific empiricism when applied to life as a whole. |
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