中小企業貸款市場的競爭比賽能否提高融資效率？台灣隱性政策干預的研究

Can Horse Racing in the SME Loan Market Bolster Financing Efficiency? A Study of an Implicit Policy Intervention in Taiwan

本研究顯示，善意的官方政策可能導致中小企業貸款市場的競爭比賽和過度信貸。由於經濟增長放緩，2016 年8 月，台灣政府通過獎勵計劃向國內銀行發出了強烈呼籲以緩解中小企業信貸緊縮。截至該年底，中小企業新增貸款餘額在四個月內出人意料地增長了三倍。然而，這種由政府驅動的慷慨－－因而具有政策性干預的本質－－並沒有產生預期的結果。大部分貸款流向了上市櫃的中小企業，只有一小部分流向了私人中小企業，即便私人中小企業才通常面臨著更多的融資限制與流動性需求。遺憾的是在獲得大量資金之後，上市櫃中小企業隨後營運表現不佳。我們認為，政府對銀行的不當呼籲導致了市場信用分配的錯置以及對上市櫃中小企業的過度信貸，因而導致代理問題並損害績效。

This study shows that a well-intended official policy can result in horse racing and misallocation problems in the SME loan market. As a result of slowing economic growth, in August 2016, the Taiwanese government made a clarion call to domestic banks by ramping up the incentives to alleviate the SME credit crunch. In the four months between the government’s call and the end of the year, the balance of incremental SME loans underwent an unexpected three-fold increase. However, this generosity—motivated by the government and therefore political in nature—did not produce the desired outcomes. The majority of lending went to publicly listed SMEs, leaving only a tiny portion for privately held SMEs—a group that usually faces more financing constraints and needs the liquidity. Unfortunately, after receiving this substantial funding, publicly listed SMEs underperformed. We argue that the government’s improper call to banks resulted in misallocation of credit in the market and over-crediting of publicly listed SMEs and gave rise to agency problems that harmed firms.