英文摘要 |
The development of the CCP’s maritime “gray zone” strategy uses military-civilian integration and mobilization. The strategy integrates non-military resource sharing, avoids crossing the threshold of military conflicts at sea, operates flexibly including low-intensity conflicts in the East China Sea, land reclamation in the South China Sea to build forward bases, and establishing an overseas base in Djibouti. This article explores the ways in which the CCP used various parts of its maritime “gray zone” strategy to understand how it attained favorable political goals, based on the concerns raised by the U.S. military in the U.S.’s “Quadrennial Defense Review Report February 2010,” about the enemy’s “hybrid warfare” tools. First of all, in order to control and manage the development of disputes gradually, the CCP formed an asymmetric advantage in its military strategy over the Western Pacific region. Secondly, the CCP grasps the essentials to avoid conflicts with the U.S. military at sea and prepares to use “hybrid warfare” tools to confront the U.S. and Taiwan. Finally, when the benefits of the “fait accompli” of China’s naval modernization and offshore area strength advantages are obtained, and it has attained the necessary military power to fight the United States, the CCP will be committed to the ultimate victory. |