韋伯的理念型與視角主義：介於康德與尼采之間的多元客觀性

Max Weber’s Ideal Type and Perspectivism: the Pluralistic Objectivity between Kant and Nietzsche

韋伯承繼康德在價值與事實之間的區分，而且非常在意此一議題，因此不論是在〈學術作為一種志業〉的演講，或是〈社會科學的與社會政策的知識之“客觀性”〉的前半部，以及〈社會學與經濟學的諸科學之“價值中立”的意義〉這篇文章，都明確區分了認知與評價。這主張有別於尼采的生命哲學認為所有的認知背後都有評價。從而，韋伯對於理念型的構想也是基於康德的認識論中超驗的範疇在認識上的關鍵角色，主張理論觀點或理論概念決定了我們在研究中的所見與未見。
但在另一方面，本文主張，韋伯所引進的價值關聯的概念，卻也是在其歷史多因性的基本立場上，證成了理念型的多元性。因而呼應了尼采視角主義對所謂「客觀性」的見解，以及前述認知背後總是有評價的主張。亦即，由於影響歷史的因素是無法窮盡的，我們只能選擇我們感興趣的角度來理解某個歷史性的實在的成因，故而有越多從不同觀點來建構切入此一歷史性的實在的理念型，就越加有助於我們「完備」地理解這段歷史。但更重要的是，此處所謂的「感興趣」其實是受到我們的價值的影響，這使得韋伯的社會學方法論同時也帶著尼采的視角主義的色彩。
因之，韋伯的社會學方法論中所謂的「客觀性」，既非康德式的普遍客觀，也非一般誤以為尼采所代表的相對主義，而是多元客觀性。

Weber inherits Kant’s distinction between value and fact, and is so concerned with this issue that he makes a clear distinction between cognition and evaluation, in his lecture “Science as a Vocation”, in the first part of “The ‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy”, and in the article “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Economics”. This is in contrast to Nietzsche’s philosophy of life, which assumes that all cognition is backed by evaluation. Thus, Weber’s conception of the ideal type is also based on Kant’s epistemology of the crucial role of the transcendental categories in cognition, arguing that theoretical perspectives or theoretical concepts determine what we see and what we do not see in our research.
On the other hand, the concept of value relevance introduced by Weber is also a proof of the plurality of ideal types on the basis of his fundamental position of multi-causality of history. Thus, it echoes Nietzsche’s perspectivism regarding the so-called “objectivity” and the claim that there is always an evaluation behind the cognition. In other words, since there is no end to the number of factors that influence history, we can only choose the perspectives that interest us in understanding the causes of a particular historical reality, so that the more ideal types that are constructed from different perspectives about this historical reality, the more “holistic” our understanding of this history will be. But more importantly, the so-called “interest” here is in fact influenced by our values, which makes Weber’s sociological methodology at the same time tinged with Nietzsche’s perspectivism.
Consequently, the ‘objectivity’ in Weber’s sociological methodology is neither Kantian universal objectivity, nor the relativism that is generally mistaken for Nietzsche. It is pluralistic objectivity.