英文摘要 |
Insufficient protection and excessive judicial expansion co-exist for legal interests. The structural analysis of concept shows that the essence of legal interests is rights. Thus, the question of whether civil rights and legal interests are equally or differentially protected no longer exists. Even under the old concept, respectively within the civil rights and legal interests, differentiated protection is absolute, and equal protection is relative. Corresponding to the fact that the protection of absolute rights takes the object as the core, the real legal interest (the new concept of legal interest) is the totality of rights protected by the absolute obligation norm with behavior as the core, and the subject and object of which are temporarily unclear but actually exist. Under the new concepts of right and legal interest, the chaotic understanding of rights/obligations in traditional theories can be clarified as an absolute right-absolute duty framework, and in other cases it is a mixture or relativization of the two. This theoretical framework makes the examination of the constituent elements of tort liability of civil rights and legal interests have an equal starting point, so that the principle of legal prescription of both rights and obligations has a clearer boundary and a clearer way to realize them, so as to solve the aforementioned problems, and also highlights the relationship between public law and private law and the idea of regarding private rights as the basis. |