我國大法官任命制度爭議之探討－－兼論與德國聯邦憲法法院法官選任制度之比較

Studying the Controversy over the Appointment System of Grand Justices in Taiwan: In comparison with the Selection System for Judges of Federal Constitutional Court in Germany

依我國憲法增修條文規定，自2003年起，司法院大法官置十五人，由總統提名，經立法院同意後任命，任期八年，個別計算，並不得連任，兼任司法院正副院長之大法官不受任期保障。憲法增修條文並規定，2003年總統任命之大法官，其中半數（八位）任期為四年，另半數（七位）任期為八年。以上大法官任命制度實施以來，在實務運作上引發幾項爭議：首先，憲法規定兼任司法院正副院長之大法官不受任期保障，是否指總統可隨時撤換司法院正副院長？其次，憲法規定大法官八年任期「個別計算」，又規定2003年新制實施時首任大法官其中半數任期為八年，另半數為四年，憲法如此規定的用意是要建構每四年改任半數大法官的任期交錯制（即形成固定兩組任期交錯的大法官），還是隨機性的任期交錯制？第三，憲法禁止大法官「連任」的規定，是否也同時禁止大法官卸任一段時間後「再任」？以上三項問題，在目前的實務運作引起相當大的爭議，而有加以釐清的必要。若從強化司法獨立的精神，以及盡量避免大法官行使職權受政治干預的角度來看，總統應無任意撤換司法院院長的權力；大法官的任期交錯制應採半數任期交錯制為宜；大法官亦不宜再任。由於我國大法官任命制度在許多方面係承襲德國聯邦憲法法院法官選任制度，因此本文擬從比較德國聯邦憲法法院法官選任制度的觀點，對以上三項爭議問題進行探討，並對我國大法官任命制度提出改革方案。

In accordance with the Additional Articles of the Constitution of the Republic of China, since 2003, the Judicial Yuan shall have 15 grand justices. The grand justices shall be nominated by the President and appointed with the consent of the Legislative Yuan for an eight-year term, independent of the order of appointment to office, and they shall not serve consecutive terms. The grand justices serving as president and vice president of the Judicial Yuan shall not enjoy the guarantee of an eight-year term. The Additional Articles also stipulate that among the grand justices nominated by the president in 2003, half (eight) members shall serve for four years, and another half (seven) shall serve for eight years. Since implementing the aforementioned appointment system, several disputes have arisen during their practical operation. First, can the President replace the president and vice-president of the Judicial Yuan at any time? Second, does the Constitution intend to establish a staggered term system that replaces half of the grand justices every four years or shall it be done randomly? Third, are grand justices prohibited from reappointment following a period after resignation? The answers to the above three questions have been partially answered by choices made in practical operations. However, the current practical operations have caused considerable controversy, which must be clarified. In many respects, Taiwan’s appointment system for grand justices was inherited from the German Federal Constitutional Court. Therefore, this paper intends to probe into the above three controversial questions by comparing it to the selection system of the German Federal Constitutional Court. Furthermore, it proposes reform plans for Taiwan’s appointment system for grand justices.