英文摘要 |
Scholars have mostly examined the discussion of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders’ power succession or cadre management from an institutionalized perspective. This article argues that the main purpose for the political regulations of the CCP, including party regulations and national laws, when it comes to the selection of cadres or policy decisions, is to fulfill the historical tasks of the party and the country in a certain period of time, and to practice the idea of supreme leadership. Therefore, compared with Western institutionalized theories, the CCP is more accustomed to citing dialectical logic. Due to the inherent defects of Lenin’s system, it is difficult for the CCP’s political regulations to produce the check and balance function of constitutionalism. Once the idea of the top leader changes, coupled with the fact that there are no factions in the party to contend with it, the original norms are easily destroyed. From this point of view, Xi Jinping deliberately perpetuates the ideals of the regime, and the lack of factions within the party capable of competing with Xi Jinping has caused Xi to undermine relevant norms such as cadre succession and management. |