強幹弱枝或外重內輕？從中共「十七大」展望「十八大」後的央地關係

Centralization or Decentralization: The Prospect of a Central-Local Relationship after the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China

比較習近平與華國鋒、江澤民、胡錦濤之權力接班，有理由相信習近平的接班地位在「十八大」不會被篡奪，但不代表習近平能貫徹其政令。不論江澤民或胡錦濤主政時期，均曾面臨地方主義的阻力。該如何解釋地方的抗拒作為？此現象在中共「十八大」後是否重現？習近平會如何克服地方主義勢力的挑戰？為解答上述問題，本文採用政治利益模式，以中共「十七大」的變遷為例進行推估。本研究發現：「十八大」若延續前兩屆格局，則地方在中委會將為各省2名，在政治局為10名，在常委會為2名。地方在政治局的名額，優先名單是北京、天津、上海、重慶、廣東、江蘇、湖北、新疆等八省市的書記。地方在常委會的名額，最可能人選為汪洋與薄熙來。央地關係仍不會出現「外重內輕」的局面，雖仍可能出現地方抗拒中央政策的情形，但僅屬少數擁有較高政治利益的省市才有的舉動，觀察指標為廣東與上海。未來中央將會透過人事調動，使央地權力分配往「強幹弱枝」方向移動。關

By comparing the political power transfer patterns between Xi Jinping and Hua Guofeng and Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, it is rational to assume that Xi Jinping consolidated his power in the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). However, Xi Jinping is being questioned over his assertiveness to carry out decrees. During both Jiang’s and Hu’s administrations, they confronted local resistance. How does Xi interpret the resistance from local governments? Will the resistance recur after the 18th National Congress of the CPC? How will Xi overcome the challenge from localists? To answer the above questions this research utilizes a political interest model to make predictions about the 18th National Congress through analysis of the 17th Congress. The result indicates that, if the 18th Congress follows the deployment of the last two congresses, each province can appoint two delegates in the Central Committee, ten in the Politburo of CPC, and two in the Politburo Standing Committee. In terms of the local delegates in the Politburo, the priority provincial/municipal committee secretaries are those from Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Hubei, and Xinjiang. As for the delegates in the Politburo Standing Committee, Wang Yang and Bo Xilai are the likeliest candidates. Decentralization can be avoided in a central-local relationship. Although local governments may resist the central decrees, few provinces and cities with higher political interests will resist the central government. For this, we can regard Guangdong and Shanghai as indices. In the future, the central government will centralize authority through personnel redeployment.