終止權除斥期間之障礙事由？──評最高法院99年度台上字第2054號民事判決「勞資爭議調解障礙案」

The Obstructions of Peremption Related to Termination: A Review on Supreme Court Civil Judgement 99 Tai-Shang-Zi No. 2054 (2010) (a Case of a Mediation in Labor-Management Disputes as an Obstruction)

「除斥期間為不變期間，不得展期，以早日確定當事人間之關係」此乃與消滅時效之重大差異之一。然勞動基準法第 12 條設有雇主之終止權及除斥期間，而勞資爭議處理法第8 條則有禁止雇主於調解期間行使終止權之規定，二相運作下，如調解期間與終止權除斥期間重疊時，可能導致雇主根本無從行使、或可行使之期間所剩無幾之困境。是以，終止權是否毫無產生障礙而展期之可能？爭議油然而生。最高法院99 年度台上字第 2054 號民事判決肯認原審「障礙期間不計入，障礙前後期間合併計算」之見解，毋寧係「借用」時效停止制度解決此一爭議。然究係如何突破「除斥期間無展期可能」？如何達到我國現行民法所無之「時效停止」之效？未臻明確。本文嘗試從方法論上另闢蹊徑，於「客體判斷說」下，認定除斥期間與消滅時效同屬權利行使面向並具類似性，從而我國民法未就除斥期間設有障礙事由屬法律漏洞，應類推適用民法第 139 條時效不完成之規定予以填補。

“Peremption is a peremptory period, which cannot be extended in order to settle the relation between the parties as soon as possible.” This is one of its major difference from Extinctive Prescription. However, Article 12 of the Labor Standards Act of Taiwan stipulates the termination right of employers and its Peremption accordingly. Also, Article 8 of the Act for Settlement of Labor-Management Disputes of Taiwan stipulates that during the procedures of mediation, an employer may not terminate the labor contract. Putting these two Articles into practice, if the period of mediation overlaps with the Peremption of the termination right, it may result in a predicament that an employer is left with no time or almost no time to exercise his termination right. Therefore, the dispute on whether Peremption can be extended due obstructions arises. Supreme Court Civil Judgement 99 Tai-Shang-Zi No. 2054 upheld the view that “the period of Peremption will stop to run during an obstruction; to calculate the period of Peremption, the period before and after the obstruction will be added up.” It can be seen that the Supreme Court unequivocally borrows from “the suspension of Extinctive Prescription” to solve this problem. However, how did the Judgement break through “the absence of a suspension system in Peremption”? How did the Judgement reach the result of “suspension” when there is no such concept in the Civil Code of Taiwan? The reason is not clear. This study tries to explore a new path by utilizing the methodology of jurisprudence. First, based on the “objective judging standard”, it confirms that Peremption and Extinctive Prescription both relate to the “exercise” of rights and are similar in nature. Second, in the Civil Code of Taiwan, the absence of a suspension system in Peremption constitutes a legal loophole. Finally, it concludes that the legal loophole may be fetched up by applying Article 139 of the Civil Code of Taiwan by analogy.