中國「常態化」的國際政治認知解讀：以中印兩次邊界衝突的化解為例

Cognitive Interpretation of International Politics in China’s “Normalcy”: Take the Resolution of Conflicts between China and India as Examples

中國處理國際危機，從1960年代「寸土不讓」到1990年代「擱置爭議」的主張，再到2 1世紀在國際爭端中經常呼籲「常態化」的策略，其中中國形成了什麼樣的戰略行為模式？本文從國際政治的認知角度研究這種外交政策，根據認知與邊緣政策理論，應用國際政治認知架構做分析並解讀。本文得出了中國在某些國際爭端中的「常態化」策略，實際上是一種戰略脅迫或引導行為，在出現邊緣政策危機過程中，對方產生錯誤知覺，在對方從「誤算」到重新「估算」的時間區間內，通過實力展示及知覺傳遞，使對方接受中國的解決方案，從而解決了國際爭端，達到自身目的，防止危機進一步升級。中國這一行為雖然能解決國際爭端，但之後需要注意可能會引起另一方的不滿。

In dealing with international crises, China advocated the claims shifted from “not giving an inch of land” in the 1960s to “shelving disputes” in the 1990s, and the “normalcy” strategy in the 21st century. What kind of strategic behavior model has China formed? This paper studies this kind of foreign policy from the cognitive perspective in international politics and applies the framework to analyze and interpret it according to the theory of cognition and brinkmanship. The result of this research indicates that China’s normalcy strategy is a kind of strategic coercion – in the process of brinkmanship crisis going on. China imposes misperceptions upon the other party involved in the crisis, and in the opponent’s time interval from “miscalculation” to “re-estimation.” Then China demonstrates its strength while transmitting perceptions, forcing its opponent to accept China’s solution, thereby resolving international disputes and preventing further escalation of the crisis. Although China’s strategic coercion behaviour can resolve international disputes, it needs to be aware that such behaviours may cause dissatisfaction from the other party.