董事會之永續治理角色與董事監督義務

The Board’s Role in Sustainability Governance and Directors’Oversight Duties

有鑑於近年永續風險的攀升衝擊企業之營運，肩負受託責任與監督義務之公司董事首當其衝，誠居企業風險控制、營運方針決策、永續策略形成的關鍵角色。本文首先於第「貳」部分重點析論所課予董事之受託責任與監督義務，並說明董事監督義務與建立並執行內部遵循及ESG 資訊揭露等機制之關聯；進一步言之，本文亦回顧近年美國德拉瓦州法院在Marchand v .Barnhill、In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation 等等判決中，對於董事監督義務之闡述及啟示。環繞法遵與ESG 治理機制之建立與落實的討論，依循第「貳」部分董事監督義務之分析，董事應建立並落實內部資訊回報與遵循系統。此呼應有論者提出董事會資訊治理的概念，即董事會角色應跳脫傳統「被動」式監督的治理模式，讓董事於資訊充分的前提下「主動」地參與公司之策略形成並形塑身分認同，使營運趨勢、遵循政策及永續策略得獲完整落實。
第「參」部分則將視角拉回臺灣永續治理之法制實踐，論述核心在於臺灣法制如何協助落實董事會資訊治理、利害關係人治理；就相關管制策略，先自司法實務面向，探討我國監督義務之發展現況。再探討金管會近年來促進永續治理之政策工具，諸如：相關公司治理藍圖之陸續發布，於近年漸進式地推動公司治理評鑑，並修改年報準則等等法令；同時，臺灣證券交易所與櫃買中心發布數項永續發展守則，督促企業落實永續治理。總之，我國永續治理之法制實踐可立基於董事會資訊治理的理論層面，具體透過董事監督義務之事前與事後法律策略予以執行；同時在金管會經由如同美國老羅斯福總統所言「溫言在口、大棒在手」的軟硬法組合之管制策略下，促成我國上市櫃公司從事永續治理的轉型，來持續引導企業將外部之市場面與政府面的利害關係人治理等壓力，內化為企業內部倫理規範（諸如企業將管理階層薪酬與ESG 永續績效連結之自律機制）。藉此，將有利於董事會妥善管理其公司面臨之永續風險並量身訂作相關永續策略，以因應企業永續轉型之全球公私部門的ESG 發展趨勢。

Given that the rising risk of sustainability impacts the operation of enterprises in recent years, directors who are under fiduciary obligations and oversight duties bear the brunt of playing the vital role in managing corporate risk, making operational decisions, and mapping out sustainable strategies. In this article, Part II reviews fiduciary obligations and oversight duties imposed on directors, then discusses correlations between directors’ oversight duties and the establishment and implementation of the mechanisms of internal compliance and ESG information disclosure. After recapping recent cases decided by Delaware courts such as Marchand v. Barnhill and In re Clovis Oncology, Inc. Derivative Litigation, this article will review their elaboration and implications on directors’ oversight duties. Surrounding the discussions of the establishments of legal compliance and governance mechanisms of ESG, in accordance with the analyses of directors’ oversight duties in Part II, directors shall establish and implement systems of internal reporting and compliance. This argument echoes commentators’ concept of boards in information governance. Namely, the role of the board of directors should transform from their traditional “passive” one in merely monitoring corporate governance to a more “active” one to enable directors, while fully informed, to take initiatives in participating in forming corporate strategies and shaping corporate identities via balancing interests of stakeholders. That way, the board can map out trends in operations management, compliance policies and sustainability-related strategies.
Part III will delve into regulatory practices of sustainability governance in Taiwan and analyze how the Taiwanese legal regime would facilitate the implementation of board-level information governance and stakeholder governance. As for regulatory strategies, this article discusses current development of judicial opinions on oversight duties, then looks into policy instruments adopted by the Financial Supervisory Commission (the “FSC”) in stepping up sustainability governance, such as: announcing corporate governance blueprints successively, promoting corporate governance evaluations in a phased fashion during these years, and amending Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public Companies. In the meantime, the Taiwan Stock Exchange and the Taipei Exchange have together promulgated amendments to Sustainable Development Best Practice Principles for TWSE/TPEx Listed Companies to encourage listed companies to put sustainability governance into practice. In sum, this article argues that laws and regulations in promoting sustainability governance in Taiwan should be based on the theory of boards in information governance; with respect to substantive implementations, the laws and regulations can serve as ex ante and ex post legal strategies. Meanwhile, just as the well-known quotation of President Theodore Roosevelt, “Speak softly and carry a big stick; you will go far”, the FSC should make good use of regulatory strategies with hard and soft law combined to push listed companies to engage in transformation of sustainability governance. Specifically, those companies would internalize external pressures regarding stakeholder governance from the market and government into their internal ethical codes, e.g., through internal controls to tie executive compensation to ESG performance in corporations. Such combination of regulatory strategies would facilitate careful management of sustainable risks by boards of directors, who could then customize related sustainable development strategies, in response to the current global trend toward ESG transformations in not only public but also private sectors.