公司治理中薪酬委員會的定位與功能──以美國法為借鏡

The Role and Functions of Compensation Committees in Corporate Governance: From the Perspectives of American Law

我國公司薪酬委員會制度之引進，在相當程度上受到美國法發展的影響。然而薪酬問題在公司治理上，一方面涉及各地公司股權結構與高階經理人來源上的差異，因而如何找到實際妥善之決策者或機制，常會有一定困難。此一問題如不妥善處理，明顯會變成代理人單邊控制，並加劇傳統公司法上的代理問題。為處理此一困難，本文先從美國法上規定，對相關問題制度設計進行介紹。並隨後本於功能的觀點，回答制度設計如何回應本地現象的問題。最後，並針對臺灣近年公開公司薪資問題中限制性股票的觀察，提出值得進一步關注之點。

The adoption of the compensation committee in Taiwan has been to a considerable degree influenced by the development of its U.S. counterpart and relevant American law. However, there are usually certain difficulties in determining practically appropriate executive compensation level owing to the different ownership structures of the various companies and the source of its high-level corporate managers. If these difficulties remain unsolved, the corporation will apparently be dominated by managers alone and amplify the traditional agency problem under corporate law. To properly deal with this issue, this article first makes a comprehensive introduction of the U.S. system designed to solve the problem and uses this introduction as a basis from a functional viewpoint to attempt to answer the question of how to design the system in response to the local phenomenon in Taiwan. Lastly, this article turns to the restricted shares and its potential misuse in public companies as executive compensations in recent years in Taiwan to highlight a possible direction for future reform.