對於諾以的概念多元論的檢視：來自梅洛龐蒂的啓發

A Critical Examination of Alva Noë’s Concept Pluralism: Inspired by Merleau-Ponty

諾以提出了概念多元論來回應「智性主義」與「反智性主義」關於知覺的爭論。他論證說，概念多元論可以取代智性主義來更好地說明知覺的理解是概念性的理解。但筆者認為，他仍然過於偏向智性主義。筆者依據梅洛龐蒂的思路，提出了理解多元論與辯證統合論來解釋思維與知覺等能力之間的差異與關連。整體而言，筆者提出的這套論述比諾以的概念多元論更好地調和了「智性主義」與「反智性主義」關於知覺的爭論，因為這套論述既可以解釋與接納諾以所說的智性主義洞見與概念多元論，也可以解釋與包容反智性主義的「知覺比思維更為基礎」的核心想法。

Alva Noë proposes Concept Pluralism as a solution to the debate about perception between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, arguing that Concept Pluralism can better explain how perceptual understanding is conceptual. However, it looks to me that Concept Pluralism inclines too much towards intellectualism and presupposes Understanding Monism, that is, the thesis that conceptual understanding is the only mode of understanding. Inspired by Merleau-Ponty, I suggest both Understanding Pluralism and Dialectic Integrationism to account for the relation between thought and perception. I argue that my suggestion is promising in that it can better reconcile intellectualism and anti-intellectualism than Noë’s Concept Pluralism.