「全球最低稅負制」對國際稅法的衝擊與挑戰

The Impact and Challenge of the“Global Minimum Tax System”on International Tax Law

OECD在2015年發布15項「BEPS行動方案」，對於BEPS的防杜雖有重要貢獻，但仍不足以終結跨國企業將利潤移轉至低稅負國家的現象。為了克服上述問題，OECD提出兩項稅制調整的主要「支柱」。其中，「第二支柱」希望各國就跨國企業所賺取的利潤，應繳納「全球最低稅負」一事達成共識，其目的在於避免跨國集團內部的利潤移轉，同時也在於遏止各國競相提供低稅負的稅務競賽。
然而，「全球最低稅負制」的實施，不僅在「工業化國家」與「發展中國家」（及「新興工業化國家」）之間，埋下一個容易引發利益衝突的引信；且「所得納入規則」對於「分離原則」的違反，以及「低稅支付規則」對於「客觀淨值原則」的違反，皆缺乏正當的合憲化事由；此外，上述兩者都有一個共同的缺失，就是為了實現與美國稅法的兼容或整合，因而不得不在其中加入複雜的規則。這不僅大幅提升跨國企業的法規遵循成本，同時適用兩者的結果，也容易引發「重複課稅」的風險。
就我國法而言，「所得納入規則」與「受控外國公司稅制」雖有近似性，但將兩者同時適用的結果，實無助於上述問題的解決。反倒是，將「所得納入規則」重新調整後，再整合至「受控外國公司稅制」中，應該是我國未來在稅制規劃上，可以審慎考慮的可能選項。

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) released the“Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Action Plan”including 15 actions in 2015, which made an important contribution to the prevention of base erosion and profit shifting but is still not enough to end the phenomenon of multinational enterprises moving profits to low-taxed countries. To overcome this problem, OECD has put forward two main“Pillars”for tax system adjustments, of which“Pillar Two”hopes that countries can reach a consensus on the global minimum tax that multinational enterprises should pay for profits they make. This aims to avoid profit shifts within multinational groups and simultaneously curbs the tax competition among countries to competitively offer low taxes.
However, the implementation of the global minimum tax system has planted a fuse that is prone to creating a conflict of interest between industrialized countries, developing countries, and newly industrialized economies. Moreover, the“income inclusion rule”violates the“separation principle”, and the“undertaxed payments rule”violates the“objective net value principle”. Additionally, both lack legitimate and constitutional reasons, and both have a common deficiency; namely that, complex rules have to be added to achieve compatibility or integration with the US Tax Law. This not only significantly increases the compliance cost of multinational enterprises, but also, the application of both the rules could easily cause the risk of double taxation.
As far as the law of Taiwan is concerned, although the“income inclusion rule”and the“tax system of controlled foreign companies”are similar, the result of applying both concurrently is not helpful to solve the above problem. On the contrary, after the readjustment of the“income inclusion rule”, its reintegration into the“tax system of controlled foreign companies”should be a possible option for Taiwan to carefully consider in future planning for the tax system.