英文摘要 |
We establish a theoretical model to explore the relationship among Fintech lending, house prices, and bank screening incentives. Our analysis considering the association between mortgage and house markets reveals that the rise of Fintech mortgage lenders increases the supply of mortgages and the demand for houses, thus pushing up the house prices. Since houses are collaterals of mortgages, an increase of the house prices implies the higher value of collaterals, lowering the return difference between good and bad mortgage applicants and thus reducing bank screening incentives. Moreover, when the advance of information technology improves the screening technology of the Fintech lenders, the house prices go down, decreasing the value of collaterals and thus increasing bank screening incentives. On the other hand, when the advance of information technology increases the capital raised by the Fintech lenders, the house prices go up, decreasing bank screening incentives. Raising capital requirements or tightening monetary policy will decrease the banks’ loanable funds and thus reduce the demand for houses, pushing down the house prices and then increasing bank screening incentives. |