數字時代的人權何以重要:論作為價值系統的數字人權

Why Human Rights is Important in the Digital Age: A Research on Digital Human Rights as a Value System

數字人權面臨著獨立性難題和有效性詰問。作為反思，數字人權既不是與現有人權並列的新類別，亦不可簡單歸類為某一人權價值之下的新內容，而是強調在適度區隔人權與權利的前提下，重申數字時代人之于科技應用的自主性價值，並將人權作為評價或指引數字科技應用的價值準則。根據“權利－－義務”“解釋－－建構”的雙重界分以及“領域命題”－－“情境命題”的理路分殊，數字人權能夠細化為“人權的數字形態”“基於數字的人權”“數字中的人權”“通過數字的人權”四種形態，四者共同塑造了人權話語的象徵功能、人權概念的指示功能、人權制度的規範功能。沿此進路，數字人權更類似於一個介於純粹抽象人權價值與具體權利形態之間的“問題式範疇”，以“自主性”為價值核心進行內部整合，藉此判斷“特定事物是否具有人權價值”，並因之可能成為司法裁判過程中的價值標準。

Abstract:Digital human rights cannot be regarded as a new type of human rights or a new content of a specific human rights because of the lack of independent and effective attributes. By distinguishing between the concepts of human rights and fundamental rights, we place them in the context of the“digital age”and re-examine the“value of human autonomy”, thus making human rights a“norm of value”. Based on the criteria of“rights - obligations”and“interpretation - construction”, and distinguishing between“realm thesis”and“context thesis”, digital human rights can include“digital forms of human rights”,“digital-based human rights”,“human rights in digital form”, and“human rights through digital way”. These four exhibit the symbolic function of human rights discourse, the indicative function of human rights concepts, and the normative function of human rights institutions. Therefore,“digital human rights”is a problematic concept between abstract human rights values and concrete rights, with“autonomy”as the core value, which can judge whether things are in line with human rights standards and can therefore be applied to judicial decisions.