英文摘要 |
The dual structural imbalance of the market results in obvious deficiencies in personal protection(private law)and state protection(public law)for privacy,and the support from anti-monopoly law as a market repair mechanism is urgently needed.Anti-monopoly law’s concern about privacy infringement does not constitute a subversion of its inherent mechanism.From the outset,it has been positioned as a protection against competition rather than a link to a particular consumer welfare.The Chicago School of“price-only theory”omits non-price damage and limits the scope of application of antitrust law.New-Brandeis School’s view of competition protection with structural concerns as the core paves the way for antitrust law to meet the needs of privacy protection.The integration of the anti-monopoly law into the legal system of personal information protection not only fills the gap between private protection and state protection,but also activates self-control rules and enriches the level of national protection.This integration is by no means a simple institutional mishmash,but requires the reconciliation of potential conflicts between different protection mechanisms,and finally enables multiple protection mechanisms to go hand in hand. |