論康德的先驗反思及其規範性意涵

Kant on Transcendental Reflection and Normativity

康德在《純粹理性批判》的一篇附錄──〈歧義篇章〉中提出「先驗反思」概念，這是康德哲學中最艱澀難懂的概念之一。儘管〈歧義篇章〉大部分的內容是在批評萊布尼茲哲學，但是本文將嘗試從人類認知的角度分析「先驗反思」所隱含的規範性意涵。批判哲學關注人類認知能力的界限，以及各種表象的有效運用範圍，這是一種規範性的探究。康德認為，人類的認知是辨解性的，這意謂人類只能透過概念去認識直觀中的對象，認知即直觀與概念的綜合聯結。然而，概念與直觀本質上的差異造就人類的認知會有正確與錯誤的可能，因而會有規範性的問題。本文將指出，康德的「先驗反思」有別於傳統哲學中的「內省」與「內感官」的理解，並闡明先驗反思的規範性意涵。本文嘗試論證：唯有先驗反思能夠從根源的、先天的確定人類認知能力的有效界限與範圍。

There is no doubt that “transcendental reflection” is one of the most obscure concepts in Kant’s critical philosophy. This article will argue that transcendental reflection is a normative source for human cognition due to its discursivity depicted by Kant. Human cognition is discursive in the sense that it is only through the concepts we can know the objects in intuition. Experience is first raised by the synthetic connection of intuition and concept. But it is not necessary for the concept given by understanding to be conformed to the intuition given by sensibility. In some cases, it could trespass the limits of human experience. This discordance makes normativity indispensable for human cognition. Critical philosophy has a normative task to determine the boundaries and limitations of human capacities and their principles. It is so unveiled by the transcendental reflection that a representation is given by a certain capacity and ruled by a certain principle. This normative conception makes transcendental reflection different from inner sense and introspection in traditional philosophy.