薪酬委員會品質與CEO權力對虧損公司董監事薪酬之影響

The Impact of Compensation Committee Quality and CEO Power on Director and Supervisor Compensation in Loss-Making Firms

本研究主要檢視我國強制設立薪酬委員會後，薪酬委員會品質對虧損公司董監事薪酬增加之影響，同時檢視CEO 權力在薪酬委員會品質與虧損公司董監事薪酬增加間扮演之角色。本研究透過2012 至2017 年之上市櫃公司資料發現，薪酬委員會品質愈佳以及CEO 權力愈大時，愈能有效降低虧損公司董監事薪酬增加現象；然而，透過CEO 權力與薪酬委員會品質交乘分析，以及CEO 權力分群檢視薪酬委員會品質對虧損公司董監事薪酬增加之影響，本研究發現CEO 權力愈大，薪酬委員會品質與虧損公司董監事薪酬增加呈現正向不顯著關係，此結果說明了當CEO 權力愈大時，薪酬委員會品質對虧損公司董監事薪酬增加之影響較無抑制效果。

This paper aims to investigate the effect of the quality of compensation committee on the self-interested board of directors after the establishment of mandatory compensation committee. Moreover, this paper investigates the role of CEO power in the relationship between compensation committee quality and the self-interested board of directors. From the data of listed companies between 2012 and 2017, we find that firms with better compensation committees and higher CEO power can reduce the phenomenon of loss making firms yet increasing their director and supervisor compensation. However, we also find that CEO power cannot moderate the relationship between the quality of a compensation committee and a board compensation increase in a loss-making firm. Our results demonstrate that when the CEO has greater power, the compensation committee is less effective to prevent the board of directors and supervisors in loss-making firms from gaining unreasonably high compensation.