司法審查下的官僚裁量權：從交易成本觀點檢視大法官解釋，對違法行政命令修訂的影響

Bureaucratic Discretion under Judicial Review: A Study of Bureaucratic Rule-making on Unconstitutional Rulings from the Perspective of Transaction Costs

大法官會議對於行政部門規則制定擁有「事後」（ex post）違憲審查的權力，是研究官僚政治控制的絕佳、但一直被忽視的場域。本研究透過公共選擇理論（public choice），檢視1950年至2020年共90條針對行政命令或規則進行違法／違憲宣告的大法官解釋；這些命令／規則主管的行政機關，面對主管法規遭大法官會議解釋宣告違憲後，如何進行法規修訂的裁量行為，揭露了行政機關對面對司法審查時的反應，並能藉此觀察司法對行政的影響。本研究將90筆個案依照大法官給予行政機關的裁量空間大小，以及行政機關是否修改法令、何時修改法令、如何修改法令進行分析。本研究發現：大法官是否使用有拘束的方式進行解釋，雖然能提高命令修改的比例，但是對於控制行政機關在一定的年限內完成修正則無顯著影響。行政機關若不同意大法官的判決，或認為修正成本過高，多會拖延修正進度，用以爭取更多商議機會，亦即行政機關的決策會以「最小成本組合」（minimum cost combination）的方式回應司法審查的結果。行政機關雖然在民主行政的架構下，有忠誠執行法律授權的責任，但這種忠誠必須有來自法律以外的誘因，行政與司法賽局中的均衡點才會出現。

There is a lack of empirical studies investigating the effectiveness of judicial review on bureaucratic control in the public administration literature. To provide empirical evidence, this study surveyed the amendments of the administrative rules that were judged illegal by the Supreme Court in Taiwan from 1950 to 2020 in order to evaluate the court-administrative-rules relationship. Totally 90 cases were analyzed based on the discretionary space decided by the Supreme Court, and how the discretionary space impacted administrative agencies' decisions on when and how to amend the illegal rules. This study found that although most rules were amended as the Supreme Court requested, they were only amended after the judicial deadlines. Judicial review had limited effect on bureaucratic control because of bureaucratic self-interest orientation and the Supreme Court's lack of authority to track the amendments after the rulings. Based on the findings, this study developed a model of administrative agencies decision making pattern to describe and explain their strategies in the game with the Supreme Court. When administrative agencies dissented from the Supreme Court's rulings or believed costs to amend were too high, they may delay amendment to gain more opportunity to negotiate or to figure out new solutions. In sum, administrative agencies tend to respond the Supreme Court with the ''minimum cost combination'' to maximize their own interests. To achieve the equilibrium in the game of administration and judicial, incentives other than legal requirements for administrative agencies are needed.