遭受性侵害女性的母職經驗之研究

Study for the motherhood experience of females with sexual abuse

系所名稱：輔導與諮商研究所 學位別：博士 畢業學年：96年 指導教授：戴嘉南 本研究以敘事研究的生命史探究，深度訪談六位曾遭遇性侵害之女性的母職經驗。研究發現其除了性被害經驗之外，在童年時期大多曾經歷身體傷害或被疏忽、家庭遭逢重大壓力事件，以及與母親關係的情感糾結，這些均影響著婚姻與親子關係。此外，婚姻關係中的暴力情形，也會影響孩子的成長。然而，伴侶的支持是治療性創傷的契機，有助於母職的實踐。性被害經驗對於生物性母職的影響為：排拒婦科的身體檢查、懷孕時需面對產檢的不適。在社會性母職方面為：擔心女兒會被性侵害，投射出自己曾被性侵害的恐懼；擔心孩子受到傷害，而難以放手讓孩子獨立去探索；照顧重心放在孩子身上，忽略自己的需求，易令自己陷於疲累的循環中；生氣或憂鬱的情緒干擾會影響親職行為的表現；對於女兒維護婚前貞操的期待；因為女兒的被性傷害而記起自己過去受傷的事實。而有關性侵害的代間傳遞情形，則需要未來的研究進一步探索。研究參與者與母親的母女關係，多是經由同理母親或被母親拒絕的過程，不再執著於母愛的尋求，而學習去區隔出自我與母親的關係，建構出屬於自己且不同於其母親的母職形貌。此外，她們也從孩子的成長與回饋中看見自己的創傷，而開啟心理的療癒，如：因為孩子的行為問題而求助、因孩子遭受性傷害而受助、從孩子身上發現自己生氣的來源，或是以憂鬱表達使孩子受害的自責。亦即，當她們願意去承擔母職的挑戰，願意去面對改變時，性被害與母職的經驗即能彼此相互成長並正向影響。而在面對母職挑戰與創傷療癒的過程中，心理諮商與社會資源能夠扮演重要支持的角色。從後殖民女性主義的觀點來看，孩子是她們透過擁抱母職來實現自我，並藉以取得自我定義的權力象徵。母職也是她們對於所遭受暴力壓迫的一種抗議，並由此展現自己的自主與能力，也是重新尋求自我認同的過程。本研究發現母親角色對性創傷具有重要的意義，心理諮商需視被害人的母職實踐為單純的成為母親的過程，並協助其珍視母職經驗在性創傷的療癒角色。而助人專業所提供的處遇，除了以孩子的最佳利益為考量觀點之外，更需要關照性被害女性的母職自主性，避免壓縮母親角色的自主。最後，綜合研究結果提出對心理諮商與社會工作專業及未來研究的建議，以及研究者本身的省思。

The study tries to explore the qualification evaluation and ranking system of Qing Dynasty and to reveal how the appraisal system was conducted based upon the Regulations of Ministry of Appointment. In addition, author also tries to investigate the construction of civil official system by utilizing historical records such as Regulations of Ministry of Appointment, Draft History of the Qing dynasty, and various notes taken by writers in Qing Dynasty. Regulations of Ministry of Appointment consists of seven parts, i.e., ranking system of Manchu officers, ranking system of Mongolia officers, ranking system of Han officers, ranking system of Han-military officers, qualification evaluation rules of Manchu officers, qualification evaluation rules of Han officers, and Regulations of administrative disciplinary action. In fact, the Ranking system shows us what prerequisite required before an office can be promoted to a new position and what the position that an officer can possibly get in the future. Understanding the ranking system set for Manchu, Mongolia, Han, and Han-military officers, the researchers will be able to know the structure of the whole structure of civil official system in Qing Dynasty. As for the qualification evaluation rules of Manchu or Han officers, they are used to justify whether a candidate for a vacancy is legitimate for that opened position. The detail of qualification evaluation rules reveals that Manchu officers have better chance to get an opened position than the Han officers. The last part of Regulations of Ministry of Appointment refers to the Regulations of administrative disciplinary action and it is used to regulate the measurement of penalty for officers for committing a breach of the regulations. The disciplinary penalty could be one of the followings: forfeiting of ones’ salary, degradation of one’s rank, or discharging of ones’ duties. The harsh of disciplinary penalty depends on whether the officer needs to be directly responsible for breach of the regulations. This study also explores the origin of Ministry of Appointments and the tenure of minister of Ministry of Appointments in Qing Dynasty. By investigating the identity and background of those ministers, we can see Qing Dynasty has intentionally balanced the provinces issue by appointing roughly the same number of ministers from south or north provinces as Ming Dynasty. Furthermore, through the average tenure of those ministers, we can fairly understand whether the Qing Dynasty, politically, is in steady condition. Overall speaking, when the construction of civil official system is relatively stabilized, the tenure of the ministers also relatively longer; hence, we can see the tenure of ministers in the later stage of Qing Dynasty has longer tenure than those in the early or middle stage. The Regulations of Ministry of Appointments had been constantly revised; nevertheless, limited by the editions that can be controlled in Taiwan, this study can only take the edition issued in Qianlong 48-year while Qing Dynasty was in its most prosperous days as the foundation for further discussion. Meanwhile, this study also explored editions issued in Yongzheng 12-year, Daoguang 23-year, and Guangxu 12-year to reveal their similarities and differences. By studying the qualification evaluation rules set for Manchu and Han officers, it is clear that Manchu officers were favorably treated with more chances to get a opened position as thus to maintain Manchu’s legitimate controlling power. The designed civil official system in Qing Dynasty actually allowed Manchu’s ethnic group have extra chances to be promoted to the higher positions. “Bǐ tiē shì”, the advantageous position specially created for Manchu group, served as a typical sample to demonstrate how Qing Dynasty favored Manchu’s ethnic group. The performance appraisal in Qing Dynasty was categorized into two types, i.e., “Jīng chá” for officers stationed inside Beijing city and “Dà jì” for officers located outside of Beijing city. The rules used for appraisal were “Sì gé” (i.e., four evaluation standards) and “Bā fǎ” (i.e., eight reviewing rules). Those who performed beyond expectations will be ranked as prominent officers and such record will have positive influence on their future promotion. As for those ranked at the bottom will suffered for forfeiting of ones’ salary, degradation of one’s rank, or discharging of ones’ duties. The rule set that only 1 out of 7 of the officers in Beijing city and 1 out of 8 of the Bǐ tiē shì can be ranked as prominent. As for officers located outside of Beijing city can only 1 out of 15 chances to be listed in prominent group, not to mention those most lower-ranked officers can only have 1 out of 130 chance. The performance review result was shown in the wordings given by the superior officers and if these superior officers failed to recognize the contribution of their subordinates, the lower ranked officers may never have the chance to get positive results or even have to suffered to disadvantageous treatments. Within Bā fǎ, “lack of talent and capability” and “impatient and impetuous” can be tracked down back to middle stage of Ming Dynasty. In addition, based upon the weed out numbers in two different years during the tenure of Kangxi, around 1.41% government officers were asked to leave after performance review. Along with the 14.28% best performer, we can conclude that around 15% of government officers were ranked as excellent or very poor and the rest 85% were given average scores. Jīng chá was not conducted on regular basis by Emperor Kangxi; however, it is Yongzheng who finally successfully made Jīng chá systematically running every 3 years. This study proposed 10 findings and 6 research suggestions at end and sincerely hope the future research can adapt macro-historical views and incorporate even more formal records and research materials taken in Qing Dynasty to comprehend the real meanings of Regulations of Ministry of Appointments and what impact it has to our modern systems.