清朝官吏的銓選與品級考──以《吏部則例》規範為中心

A Study of Civil Officers’ Qualification Evaluation and Ranking System in Qing Dynasty–Focus on the Regulations of Ministry of Appointments

系所名稱：法學院碩士在職專班
學位別：碩士
畢業學年：102年
指導教授：陳惠馨
本論文係以乾隆四十八年刊行之《吏部則例》為準，以探究清代官員之銓選及品級制度，並從而瞭解清代官吏之考核方式及實施結果。同時透過研讀《吏部則例》、《清史稿》，以及清人之筆記資料，進而瞭解清代在文官制度設計上之特殊規範。
《吏部則例》計涵納《銓選滿官品級考》、《銓選蒙古品級考》、《銓選漢官品級考》、《銓選漢軍品級考》、《銓選滿官》、《銓選漢官》、《處分則例》等七個部分。品級考實即清代文官之陞官途徑，透過品級考之研究，可以充分了解滿、漢、蒙、漢軍等不同族群在升遷過程，所需具備的資歷，以及晉陞至下一個官職時的去向。至於《銓選滿官》、《銓選漢官》兩部分，則在說明滿人與漢人於銓選任用時的依據，研讀銓選之規則，可以發現滿人之任官條件，較漢人為寬鬆。《處分則例》則規範大小官吏於觸犯公罪及私罪時，所應受到之懲處內容，或罰俸、或降級、或革職，每一種懲處也隨負責之層級與直接性，而有輕重之別。
本論文一併探究吏部之起源以及清代吏部尚書之任職長短，並透過瞭解吏部尚書之身分與籍貫，可以知道清代在掌管全國大小官吏之吏部尚書一職上，就南北籍貫而言，並沒有明顯差別，顯見清代一如明代，已特別留意到平衡南北的議題。此外，透過吏部尚書平均任期之長短，也可大致看出清代整體之政治穩定度如何。整體而言，當文官體系建立的越形完備，吏部尚書的任期也相對為長，故而清代後期之吏部尚書，其任期即較前、中兩期為長。
大凡清代各朝均持續修纂《吏部則例》，惟本論文受限於可資運用之版本，故而以鼎盛時期之乾隆朝四十八年版本為討論依據。並透過與雍正、道光、光緒等其他三朝《吏部則例》之比較，以瞭解版本間之同異。同時，透過對其中銓選制度之瞭解，可以看出清代在遴選官吏時，相較於其他族群，對滿人所給予的優渥對待，尤以透過額設及筆帖式一職的制度設計，讓滿人得以有較多的任官機會，從而能夠以少數群族統治多數的漢人，以持續有效掌握其政權。
清代的官員考核，計分京官的京察，以及外官的大計兩類，考核的依據為四格與八法，考列一等者加級記名或舉以卓異，對於日後之升遷有相當重要之影響，而績效不佳者，則可能受到罰俸、降級或革職之處分。此其中，最優等之官員也有定額，京官有七分之一可列一等，滿人專屬的筆帖式可有八分之一列名一等，至於地方之道府州縣等官員，則僅有十五分之一的機會，而佐雜、教官等小官，其機率更小至一百三十分之一。考核之結果重在考語及事實兩項，上官如果對所屬人員缺乏瞭解，勢將無法臚列事實，也就無法舉以卓異或是降革處置了。
在清代所使用的八法中，才力不及及浮躁兩項，應該皆是明朝中葉以後才使用者，至於官員甄汰的比例，依據康熙年間兩次甄汰的人數，以及當時額設之官員總數推估，末位淘汰比例約為1.41％，再加上14.28％的一等官員，則最優與最劣之官員約為15％，據此可以推估考核為二、三等之官員約為85％。但京察在康熙年間或行或停，直至雍正繼位方才成為三年一次的定制。
本論文於文末，提出十項研究發現及六項後續研究建議，冀許日後之研究能以大歷史之角度，並參酌更多清代史料，以研究《吏部則例》之內涵及其對現代制度之影響程度為何。

The study tries to explore the qualification evaluation and ranking system of Qing Dynasty and to reveal how the appraisal system was conducted based upon the Regulations of Ministry of Appointment. In addition, author also tries to investigate the construction of civil official system by utilizing historical records such as Regulations of Ministry of Appointment, Draft History of the Qing dynasty, and various notes taken by writers in Qing Dynasty. Regulations of Ministry of Appointment consists of seven parts, i.e., ranking system of Manchu officers, ranking system of Mongolia officers, ranking system of Han officers, ranking system of Han-military officers, qualification evaluation rules of Manchu officers, qualification evaluation rules of Han officers, and Regulations of administrative disciplinary action. In fact, the Ranking system shows us what prerequisite required before an office can be promoted to a new position and what the position that an officer can possibly get in the future. Understanding the ranking system set for Manchu, Mongolia, Han, and Han-military officers, the researchers will be able to know the structure of the whole structure of civil official system in Qing Dynasty. As for the qualification evaluation rules of Manchu or Han officers, they are used to justify whether a candidate for a vacancy is legitimate for that opened position. The detail of qualification evaluation rules reveals that Manchu officers have better chance to get an opened position than the Han officers. The last part of Regulations of Ministry of Appointment refers to the Regulations of administrative disciplinary action and it is used to regulate the measurement of penalty for officers for committing a breach of the regulations. The disciplinary penalty could be one of the followings: forfeiting of ones’ salary, degradation of one’s rank, or discharging of ones’ duties. The harsh of disciplinary penalty depends on whether the officer needs to be directly responsible for breach of the regulations. This study also explores the origin of Ministry of Appointments and the tenure of minister of Ministry of Appointments in Qing Dynasty. By investigating the identity and background of those ministers, we can see Qing Dynasty has intentionally balanced the provinces issue by appointing roughly the same number of ministers from south or north provinces as Ming Dynasty. Furthermore, through the average tenure of those ministers, we can fairly understand whether the Qing Dynasty, politically, is in steady condition. Overall speaking, when the construction of civil official system is relatively stabilized, the tenure of the ministers also relatively longer; hence, we can see the tenure of ministers in the later stage of Qing Dynasty has longer tenure than those in the early or middle stage. The Regulations of Ministry of Appointments had been constantly revised; nevertheless, limited by the editions that can be controlled in Taiwan, this study can only take the edition issued in Qianlong 48-year while Qing Dynasty was in its most prosperous days as the foundation for further discussion. Meanwhile, this study also explored editions issued in Yongzheng 12-year, Daoguang 23-year, and Guangxu 12-year to reveal their similarities and differences. By studying the qualification evaluation rules set for Manchu and Han officers, it is clear that Manchu officers were favorably treated with more chances to get a opened position as thus to maintain Manchu’s legitimate controlling power. The designed civil official system in Qing Dynasty actually allowed Manchu’s ethnic group have extra chances to be promoted to the higher positions. “Bǐ tiē shì”, the advantageous position specially created for Manchu group, served as a typical sample to demonstrate how Qing Dynasty favored Manchu’s ethnic group. The performance appraisal in Qing Dynasty was categorized into two types, i.e., “Jīng chá” for officers stationed inside Beijing city and “Dà jì” for officers located outside of Beijing city. The rules used for appraisal were “Sì gé” (i.e., four evaluation standards) and “Bā fǎ” (i.e., eight reviewing rules). Those who performed beyond expectations will be ranked as prominent officers and such record will have positive influence on their future promotion. As for those ranked at the bottom will suffered for forfeiting of ones’ salary, degradation of one’s rank, or discharging of ones’ duties. The rule set that only 1 out of 7 of the officers in Beijing city and 1 out of 8 of the Bǐ tiē shì can be ranked as prominent. As for officers located outside of Beijing city can only 1 out of 15 chances to be listed in prominent group, not to mention those most lower-ranked officers can only have 1 out of 130 chance. The performance review result was shown in the wordings given by the superior officers and if these superior officers failed to recognize the contribution of their subordinates, the lower ranked officers may never have the chance to get positive results or even have to suffered to disadvantageous treatments. Within Bā fǎ, “lack of talent and capability” and “impatient and impetuous” can be tracked down back to middle stage of Ming Dynasty. In addition, based upon the weed out numbers in two different years during the tenure of Kangxi, around 1.41% government officers were asked to leave after performance review. Along with the 14.28% best performer, we can conclude that around 15% of government officers were ranked as excellent or very poor and the rest 85% were given average scores. Jīng chá was not conducted on regular basis by Emperor Kangxi; however, it is Yongzheng who finally successfully made Jīng chá systematically running every 3 years. This study proposed 10 findings and 6 research suggestions at end and sincerely hope the future research can adapt macro-historical views and incorporate even more formal records and research materials taken in Qing Dynasty to comprehend the real meanings of Regulations of Ministry of Appointments and what impact it has to our modern systems.