公司治理面向下獨立董事、勞工董事之定位－－兼論信賴義務內涵與責任配套機制

系所名稱：財經法律研究所 學位別：碩士 畢業學年：97年 指導教授：陳彥良 從歷史的發展脈絡來看，公司制度之存在由來已久，而在傳統的物權理論分析下，公司之本質即為謀求股東最大之利益，且在企業所有與企業經營分離的趨勢之下，為維護股東利益，最直接的方法即是將股東利益提升至他人利益之上。然而，這種將股東權益優先於其他利害關係人權益之結論，著實已不符合時代潮流與社會人民對公司之期待，故引起了許多法學者的討論。因此，遂有學者主張，公司之本質不應該是追求股東之最大利益，而是應當追求「公司本身」之最大利益，亦即公司經營除應考量股東之利益外，尚須相對兼顧社會之利益，此為企業社會責任之發端。就公司永續經營的觀點來看，此一理論，似乎較符合多數人之利益。然企業社會責任本身係屬抽象之道德觀念，若不將之落實於具體規範中，則不免淪為空喊口號的窘境。而此一落實方法，應從公司治理領域做起。此外，根據契約連鎖理論之論證，基於契約平等，公司內所有利害關係人之利益均為平等，並無何者利益較高之問題。是以，如何以外部成本最小化之方式做成所有權安排，使代理成本減少，並實現公司利益之最大化，亦成為公司治理上重要之研究課題及目標。值得注意者，於此一治理模式下，董事會遂成為所有公司經營要素之核心。就我國內部監控機關之結構而言，目前是採取「並列制」之設計，惟學界認為現行監察人制度並未發揮法律政策所期待之應有功能，從而，在檢討監察人之制時，曾被認為係世界上最優良之獨立董事制度，遂被提出討論。就另一方面而言，既然勞工在公司治理法制之架構中，係被劃分為公司利害關係人之角色，是以，如何在討論強化公司治理之同時，並顧及勞工等利害關係人之權益，更為本文所欲探討之重要課題之一。再者，依英美法認為董事與公司間之關係為一種信賴關係，且基於此等關係之存在，故董事應對公司負有所謂的信賴義務。「信賴義務」之主要內容傳統上二分為注意義務與忠實義務，係美國公司法上最重要之議題。注意義務係指董事於執行其決策或監督功能時所付出之注意及小心謹慎之態度；而忠實義務則係指董事於處理公司事務時，必須出自為公司最佳利益之目的而為，不得圖謀自己或第三人之利益。然而，於安隆風暴後，各界更加強公司治理法制之推動，尤其是法院對於董事信賴義務之概念與落實亦產生極大之影響，即法院提升了對於董事要求之合理性標準，進一步反應而出的即是信賴義務內涵之適度調整，最明顯之關鍵即在於實務及學界對於善意義務之討論。最後，法定義務之強化會降低董事職務之誘因，尤其針對獨立董事及勞工董事（特殊董事）而言，畢竟其是基於社會性及公益性而設置，且二者報酬通常皆相當有限，再由於本質上多為非財產參與之形式，因此，對於特殊董事權益之保障，應更甚於一般董事之程度，以求能吸引其進入公司，替公司追求最大利益。換言之，關於特殊董事之民事賠償責任，不應繼續維持傳統之規範方式及內涵，且適當的責任配套機制對於特殊董事來說，肯定是緩和董事信賴義務明確化及責任訴追機制完備後，所造成之訴訟風險與反誘因。是以，藉由分析、歸納國外對於特殊董事責任配套機制之實証及論述，並討論我國法制上及實踐上有無引進或適用此類配套機制之彈性，以進一步完善設置特殊董事制度之規範目的。

In the context of development of business organizations, corporate systemexists for a long time. In the perspective of traditional ownership theory, thenature of the corporation is to pursue shareholders’ greatest benefits. Under thetrend of separation of ownership and control, taking the shareholders’ interestsas the priority should be the best way to reserve shareholders’ benefits.However, this theory seemed to be outdated, and the conflict between the oldtheory and the expectation of modern people prompts the discussions amonglaw scholars. Hence, some scholars argue that the nature of the corporation is topursue the maximum profits for the corporation per se, instead of shareholders’benefits. Corporation should take social benefits into consideration in additionto shareholders’ own interest. This is how the concept regarding corporatesocial responsibility came up. Therefore, this theory seems according to mostpeople. Nevertheless, the social responsibility of corporate is still an abstractconcept and may become merely a slogan if not being implemented bylegislation. Consequently, it should be carried out through corporategovernance.In terms of nexus of contracts, all shareholders’ interests are equal andparallel to stakeholders’ owing to the equalization of the contract. To reduceagency costs by making appropriate ownership arrangement along withminimizing the external costs as well as maximizing the corporate benefitsbecomes an important issue of corporate governance. Under this model, theboard of directors becomes the core factor of corporate governance. Ourcountry has adopted the two-tier system as the structure of internal governancemechanism; yet the academics suggest that the current supervising systemhasn’t been fully elaborated as what legislator expected. For this reason, thisindependent director system, once regarded as the best corporate governanceregime, was introduced and discussed. On the other hand, since the labor forceis classified as the corporate stakeholders in the corporate governanceframework, it is also important to take labors’ rights and interests into accountat the same time while discussing how to enhance corporate governancemechanism.Moreover, there is a fiduciary relationship between the corporation and thedirector in common law. The corporate director is subject to the fiduciary duty.Traditionally, this fiduciary duty is divided into two types—duty of care andduty of loyalty, which is the most important issue in the U.S. corporate law.Duty of care means the attention paid by the director and his cautious attitudetowards the implements of decision and monitoring; while the duty of loyaltymeans when dealing with the corporation’s affairs the director shall pursuecorporate greatest benefits instead of self’s or others’ benefits. However, afterthe Enron case, the importance of corporate governance has been more andmore emphasized. The Enron case has also tremendously impacted the court’sacknowledgement and implement of directors’ fiduciary duty. This has evenraised the standard of rational business judgment on directors and thenreflected the proper adjustment of the content of fiduciary duty, which can beseen most obviously from the discussion of duty of good faith by the academicand practical fields.Finally, the enhancement of the statutory duty can reduce theattractiveness of being a director, especially for the independent director andlabor director that are set for social and public interests reasons with limitedcompensation and participations in terms of non-proprietary. So this type ofdirector's right should be better protected in order to pursue the maximumbenefits of the corporation. In other words, it should not follow the traditionalstandard used to be applied to the director's special civil liability, and the properliability related set mechanism to the special director must have alleviated thelawsuit risk and its anti-seduction caused by the explicitness of the directors’fiduciary duty and the completeness of liability lawsuit mechanism. To sum up,this thesis will complete the purpose of establishing the system of specialdirectors, through inductive and deductive analysis of both domestic andinternational experiments and theories of the special director liability setmechanism, and further discuss on the adaptability of this mechanism legallyand practically to our country.