國際合作理論的再檢視：以美中治理貿易中的食品安全為例

A Re-examination of International Cooperation Theories: Lessons from the Governance of Food Safety Issue in U.S.-China Trade

常理上，一國頻繁發生之食安醜聞應該會讓該國生產的食品成為許多國家禁止輸入或嚴格管制的對象。然而，本文發現，特定期間的食安醜聞反而成為強化美中兩國共同進行食安治理的助力，讓雙方自2007年開始漸漸形成制度化的政府間合作。為什麼食安醜聞沒有成為妨礙美中兩國食品貿易往來的阻力，反而還促成雙方共同治理食安之合作呢？奠基於利益偏好（preference）和國內政治（domestic politics）之學理，本文主張，代表國家實際進行食安管制的政府、從事食品製造與銷售之業者，還有一般民間市場上的消費者之間的國內三方互動和由此互動過程中建構出之利益偏好，能夠有效地解釋美中為何攜手共同治理貿易中的食品安全（food safety）。研究結果指出，與貿易議題有關的國際合作能否形成，國內政治中的「偏好」扮演關鍵角色。而相較於食品出口國，進口國的國內政治通常又發揮更為顯著之影響。

"Why did food scandals not hinder the food trade between the U.S. and China, but instead promote the cooperation between the two sides to govern food safety issue together? Based on the theories of preferences and domestic politics, this paper argues that the domestic tripartite interaction between the government (that actually conducts food safety management), businesses (engaged in food manufacturing and sales), and consumers (in the general private market) and the preferences constructed in the process of their interactions can well explain why the U.S. and China can work together to tackle food safety issue in trade. The research finding shows that whether international cooperation that related to trade could be formed, preferences that one country has at the domestic level play a key role. Further, the domestic politics of importing countries often plays a more significant role than what it does in food exporting countries."