會計穩健原則在現金持有上的效果──考量代理成本

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Cash Holdings: In Consideration of Agency Cost

本研究探討會計原則較為穩健的公司，其介於管理者與利害關係人之間代理問題的多少是否影響現金持有政策的改變。我們也進一步檢視了公司在會計穩健與現金持有率的關係，以及是否較為穩健的會計以及維持較高的現金持有率的金融公司會有較強的預防動機。研究結果顯示，公司的會計穩健是會減緩因代理問題所產生的代理成本。現金持有率的改變可以降低代理成本。對有發行證券與長期債券的公司，穩健會計與現金持有改變率的關係是正向的。當公司具有較高的穩健會計原則與較為增加的現金持有率時，會傾向有較強的預防動機。

"This study explores whether the firm with higher accounting conservatism has less agency problems between managers and stakeholders and whether the firm's higher agency costs will affect its change of cash holdings. We further examine the relationship between accounting conservatism and the change rate in cash holdings for firms, and whether the firms with higher accounting conservatism and higher the increase rate in cash holdings have a stronger and higher precautionary motive. The findings show that the firm's accounting conservatism can slow down its agency cost due to agency problem. The change rate in cash holdings of a firm decreases in agency cost. For firms with securities offerings and long-term debts, there is a positively relationship between accounting conservatism and the change rate in cash holdings. Moreover, when firms with higher accounting conservatism and higher increase rate of cash holdings, they have stronger precautionary motives."