再論荀學「禮義」的意義：理論一致性與道德動力為探究的進路

The Concept of ''Li-Yi'' in Xunzi's Philosophy Revisited: An Inquiry into the Consistency of Theory and Moral Motivation

學者對荀學「聖人編制禮義」如何可能的質疑，主要來自於宣稱（P）「今人之性，固無禮義，故彊學而求有之也；性不知禮義，故思慮而求知之也」。這意指荀學中的「性或心」不具道德主體性、不是道德（禮義）的根源」。他們認為宣稱（P）會導致荀學面臨（Q）「非道德價值如何產生道德價值」的倫理學問題，以及衍生兩個問題：（Q1）「無法證成初代聖人或禮義從何而來，以及後續編制禮儀法度如何可能的理論困局」；（Q2）「行動者如何判定他透過後天工夫所認知到的是道德的，而非違反道德或非道德的東西」。然而，我們認為上述問題來自於（1）他們以孔孟意義下的道德來非難荀學。（2）他們未區分所探究的對象是「理論一致性」或是「理論效力」中的道德動力。將二者混為一談往往會產生的誤解是：以「荀學內部可能存在的理論效力問題」詬病「荀學理論內部存在不一致的問題」。要回應上述問題也涉及了詮釋態度，即：（1）荀學實際上說了什麼？（2）如何理解荀學實際所說之意涵？（3）基於（1）和（2），荀學應當主張而並未實際主張什麼？當涉及如何詮釋經典時，我們不僅要了解「荀學以其立場理解經典的結果」，亦當釐清「根據荀學核心主張，邏輯上應當推導出哪些詮釋結果」。只要我們劃出詮釋界線並遵守之，則可以避免問題歧岔以及衍生不必要的枝蔓。本文將論證荀學沒有來自宣稱（P）的三個問題。

"Xunzi claims that (P): ''Now people's nature is originally without Li and Yi. Thus, they must force themselves to engage in learning and seek to possess them. Their nature does not know of Li and Yi, and so they must think and reflect and seek to know them.'' This statement may lead to some confusions: without recognizing the goodness of human nature, how do sages create Li-Yi (禮義 Propriety and Righteousness) in Xunizi's philosophy? There are some critics refer to the claim (P) will lead to the ethical predicament (Q): ''moral value cannot be derived from non-moral value.'' Moreover, the related problems as follows: (Q1) ''The existence of the first-generation-sage and the possibility of justifying Li-Yi cannot be explained by Xunzi's philosophy.'' Moreover, (Q2) ''how are people able to believe what they identify as a posteriori is morally justified?'' However, we believe that the above-mentioned problems are aroused from the following claims: (1) Commentators criticize Xunzi's philosophy on the basis of Mencius' definition of morality. (2) They do not distinguish between ''the consistency of theory'' and ''the moral motivation of ''the effectivity of theory.'' We find that the misunderstanding of Xunzi's philosophy is caused by the confusion of (1) and (2). In order to respond to the above-mentioned problems, we should bear the following interpretative attitudes in mind: (1) What does Xunzi's philosophy actually claim? (2) How should people interpret the meanings of these claims? (3) In line with (1) and (2), what Xunzi's philosophy ought to argue? Thus, in this paper, we will show that Xunzi's philosophy does not entail those three problems derived from claim (P)."