論雙重股權結構監管制度的構建：以控制權利益的內涵為視角

公司控制權可能被經營者濫用以追求自身利益，但它也可以保護並激勵經營者為公司實施其作為企業家的獨有見識並努力獲得企業專用型知識和技能。雙重股權結構會惡化控制權利益的黑暗面，但又能夠支持其光明面。因此，雙重股權結構的監管制度應當遏制經營者濫用該類結構損害公司和外部股東的利益，但同時不應當對經營者通過該類結構掌握控制權造成重大損害或限制。為達成這一目標，監管機構可以對股東投票權與剩餘索取權的分離程度進行適當限制，也可以通過事件型日落規則將雙重股權結構與創始人對公司的領導綁定在一起。不過，後一種監管方式會使全面禁止雙重股權資本重組成為必要。與此同時，監管機構通常不應當採用突破規則和時間型日落規則。中國大陸關於雙重股權結構的監管制度並未達到遏制控制權利益黑暗面與支持其光明面之間的平衡，其中的部分規則有待改進。

"Managers may abuse corporate control to pursue their self-interests, but such control can also protect entrepreneur-managers' efforts to pursue their idiosyncratic vision for the corporation and to acquire firm-specific knowledge and skills, thereby inspiring them to do so. Dual class share structures may aggravate the dark side of the private benefits of control but may also support their bright side. Hence the regulatory regime of dual class structures should prevent managers from abusing such structures to harm the corporation and outside shareholders but should not weaken, to any significant extent, managers' ability to acquire control through such structures. To reach this goal, regulators may impose reasonable limits on the separation of shareholders' voting rights and residual claims, and they may also employ event-based sunset rules to bind together a dual class structure and a founder's leadership of the corporation. However, the latter regulatory approach necessitates a total ban on dual class recapitalizations. At the same time, regulators normally should not adopt a breakthrough rule or a time-based sunset rule. China's regulatory regime of dual class structures has not struck the right balance between curbing the dark side of the private benefits of control and supporting their bright side, and some relevant rules need to be improved."