酬委員會對績效敏感性與內控缺失關聯性之影響──以台灣初次上市櫃及首次公開發行公司為例

The Effect of Compensation Committees on the Association between Pay Performance Sensitivity and Internal Control Weaknesses: Evidence from Taiwan IPO Firms

本研究旨在探討薪酬決策者是否因內部控制缺失，而調整會計盈餘與高階管理團隊薪酬間之關聯性（亦即薪酬績效敏感性），並基於最適化薪酬契約理論及管理者權力理論，將薪酬委員會品質及管理者於企業內部之權力納入考量，以檢驗高階管理團隊薪酬績效敏感性受到內部控制缺失之影響程度，是否會受到薪酬委員會之品質或高階管理團隊所握有之權力而改變，藉以捕捉影響高階管理團隊薪酬契約之因素。本研究以我國初次上市櫃（包含櫃轉市）之公司為研究對象，研究期間為2011至2015年。實證結果顯示，高階管理團隊薪酬績效敏感性確實會因內部控制存有缺失而降低，而隨著薪酬委員會之品質愈高，內部控制缺失對薪酬績效敏感性之影響越強；但高階管理團隊之權力則會削弱內部控制缺失對薪酬績效敏感性之影響。

"This study investigates the effect of internal control weaknesses on the association between accounting performance and compensation for top managers (pay performance sensitivity, PPS). We also examine the moderating effects of compensation committee quality and managerial power on the relationship between internal control weakness and PPS. Using a sample of Taiwanese IPO firms (including the GTSM-TWSE Transfer Companies) during the period 2011-2015, we find that internal control weaknesses weaken PPS. We also find that high quality compensation committees can strengthen the relationship between internal control weaknesses and PPS, whereas managerial power tends to weaken this relationship."