對羅森陶反意識本有主義論證之回應

A Response to Rosenthal’s Arguments against the Intrinsic View of Consciousness

羅森陶指出若意識被當作一種本有性質，它就會是單純與不可分析的，並且因此無法提供科學性的說明，因為科學性說明要求一種具有心靈的外在性質的關係式架構。我首先從概念分析的角度批評羅森陶反本有主義的論證。接著，逐一檢視羅森陶三個反本有主義的論證：及物與非及物意識區分的論證、報告與表達的論證，與個別化心靈狀態的論證。我建議將單一心靈狀態的內容視為一個訊息空間，可以用之來說明意識。我依據兩種不同型態的本有主義來反對羅森陶的立場：一種是包含自我表徵，另一種則不包含。我們將會發現這兩種類型的理論，在自然主義的視角下都擁有解釋的力量。

Rosenthal argues that if consciousness is seen as intrinsic, it will appear to be simple and unanalyzable, and therefore not amenable to scientific explanation, which requires a relational structure involving an extrinsic property of the mind. I shall first criticize Rosenthal's argument against intrinsicalism by way of conceptual analysis. I shall then examine three of his arguments against the intrinsic view of consciousness: the argument from the distinction between transitive and intransitive consciousness, the argument from reporting and expressing, and the argument of the individuation of mental states. I suggest that the content of a mental state can be considered to be an information space, which will allow for an explanation of consciousness. My rejection of Rosenthal's position relies on distinguishing two different forms of intrinsicalism: with and without self-representation. We shall find that both versions have explanatory traction from a naturalistic perspective.