自然與性情：重新檢視王弼「性其情」的義理內涵

Nature and Disposition and Feeling: A Reexamination of the Philosophical Connotation of Wang Bi's ''Naturalization of Feeling''

本文嘗試重新檢視王弼《論語釋疑》中「性其情」的說法，以釐清當代詮釋此說的疑問，為理解王弼性情論提供不同看法。全文分兩部分討論王弼「性其情」的思想內涵，第一，從三方面討論王弼「性其情」思想的繼承與內涵，首先疏理傳統道家論性情的義理脈絡，以見王弼性情論與道家思想異同，繼而從王弼其他文本論性情處揭示王弼思想中「性」與「情」的關係，最後整理王弼「性其情」的說法與其他地方論性情內容以見其思想的一致性，並指出王弼論「性」、「情」均屬中性義，「性」不全等同於「自然」，「情」非「性」對治對象。第二，從三方面討論王弼「性其情」思想的接續與詮釋轉折，首先比較王弼以「性其情」詮釋《論語》「性相近」的說法，以凸顯二者論性情的異同；其次進一步比較儒道論仁義之性的異同，以見王弼與《論語》言性之義理分際；最後透過比較王弼與伊川「性其情」的說法，揭示當代詮釋或受宋明理學後設研究影響，造成對王弼「性其情」有不同的理解。

This paper reexamines Wang Bi's theory of ''naturalization of feeling'' by reviewing his work Explication of Doubts on the Analects, to clarify questions arising from contemporary interpretation of the theory, and to provide different points of view on how to understanding the theory. The discussion is divided into two sections in this paper. The first section discusses how Wang carried on previous studies of ''naturalization of feeling'' and its connotation from three perspectives. First, the traditional Taoist approaches to ''naturalization of feeling'' are sorted out and compared with Wang's position, to highlight the differences and similarities between the two conceptual thoughts. And the examination of other works and commentaries by Wang reveals how ''disposition'' and ''feeling'' are interrelated in Wang's system of thought. The consistency between Wang's theory of ''naturalization of feeling'' and his other theories further indicates that, in Wang's view, the tendencies of ''disposition'' and ''feeling'' are both neutral, ''disposition'' is not an exact equivalence to ''nature,'' neither is ''feeling'' governed by ''disposition.'' In the second section, this paper focuses on the conceptual continuation and interpretative turn of Wang's theory of ''naturalization of feeling.'' By studying how Wang interpreted ''by nature, men are nearly alike'' in Confucian thought with the theory of''naturalization of feeling,'' this paper illustrates the differences and similarities between the two approaches of interpreting ''disposition'' and ''feeling.'' Furthermore, it compares the Confucian and Taoist interpretations of the disposition of morality to demonstrate the philosophical difference between the Confucian and Wang's views on ''disposition.'' Finally, by comparing Wang and Yi-Chuan's theories of ''naturalization of feeling,'' this paper further demonstrates how contemporary interpretation of Wang's theory has been affected by the meta-analysis of Sung-Ming Confucianism.