我國立法院黨團協商的制度變遷與制度化

The Institutional Changes and Institutionalization of the Party Negotiation Mechanism in the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan

黨團協商已經是我國國會重要的立法程序，被視為增進立法效率和解決朝野僵局的機制。由於研究多半受限資料的不完整，關於黨團協商運作機制相關理論甚少。這種情況在第9屆立法院出現改善，協商會議實況與文字紀錄均在立法院網站公開。不僅如此，此屆立法院政黨席次大幅洗牌，首次民進黨單一過半並由非國民黨委員擔任立法院長。本文將以制度化的角度來檢視第9屆的黨團協商運作：面對立法環境生態的劇烈變動，第9屆黨團協商機制的制度運作是否出現變化？立法院長在協商中扮演的角色為何？現行協商機制是有利於多數黨還是少數黨？最後探討黨團協商基於何種因素影響委員會決議？本文比較了第8屆與第9屆的提案進度與黨團協商的關係，並以第9屆送交黨團協商的審查會版本法案作為分析單位，檢驗協商記錄和法案內容，輔以黨團幹部與委員會召委的深度訪談，以期了解黨團協商的制度變化。研究結果顯示，第9屆黨團協商機制，無論是在制度實際運作、立法院長的角色、對政黨立法產出的影響，都與第8屆有很大的差異。以制度化角度來看，第9屆黨團協商制度化程度明顯提升，法案均照一定程序進行，高達九成的協商法案完成三讀，以往高比例法案受到擱置的情形不再。再者，黨團協商會議已經形成分流，依據法案爭議程度，大協商由立法院長主持，小協商則由召委負責。在立法院長角色上，依照協商分級制度，第9屆立法院長只主持爭議性法案，角色明顯由協調者轉為主持人，立法院長對協商成敗的關鍵影響力不若以往，黨團協商的程序規則已能依照普遍性原則來執行。最重要的是，由於上述的制度性變革，造成協商彈性盡失，導致協商失敗的法案只能往院會表決一途，此種轉變明顯有利於多數黨。最後，我們分析了黨團修改委員會決議的動機，並指出行政機關在黨團協商機制中有實質影響力，卻未有相關制度規範，這很可能是黨團協商後續制度化的隱憂。

The party negotiation mechanism has been a pivotal legislative procedure of the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan, and it has come to be regarded as a mechanism for improving legislative efficiency and resolving impasses between the ruling party and the opposition party. Due to the specialty of the party negotiation mechanism in legislative studies, there are few related theories and most research is limited by incomplete data. However, the situation had changed with the 9th Legislative Yuan in which the meeting minutes of the party negotiation mechanism had been opened to the public for the first time. Moreover, the political structure of Legislative Yuan changed drastically–the DPP won a legislative majority for the first time, allowing the party to appoint the legislative president–a position which had always been held by KMT legislators in the past. The questions this article aims to answer are: With the radical changes in the political structure of the legislative environment, did any formal or informal institutional transformations occur? What level of institutionalization has been achieved? What is the motivation for the caucus to modify the committee’s resolutions? This article compares the legislative initiatives of the 8th and 9th Legislative Yuan, and analyzes the contents and results of bills and records of committee meetings, which act as the units of analysis in order to examine the influence of the party negotiation mechanism. We also utilize in-depth interviews with caucus leaders and committee conveners to understand the actual operation of the negotiations. In general, our findings show that the 9th Legislative Yuan was much more institutionalized than the 8th, that up to 90% of the bills had been successfully enacted, meaning that there was no longer a phenomenon of high rates of bills being defaulted during negotiations, as they had been in the past. Furthermore, the president of the Legislative Yuan who used to be very influential to the results of negotiations has changed into a role that doesn’t intervene in the disputes but only focuses on the procedure. With the lack of the president’s mediation, the breakdown of the negotiation can only move to roll call votes. This change is apparently favorable to the ruling party. With regards to the motivation of the caucus, bills of ideological confrontation and party competition likely end in negotiation deadlocks, while bills of cognitive divergence mostly finish with content modification.