英文摘要 |
The purpose of shareholder activism is to actively create a legal environment conducive to shareholders' participation in corporate affairs and to establish a well-established legal system. Accordingly, such system allows shareholders to exercise their shareholder rights to protect their interest and maintain their influence through the shareholders' meeting. However, its background and applicable legal environment as well as the latest evolutionary trend of the ''New Financial Capitalism'' cannot be directly applied to Taiwan's legal system. In 2018, the Company Act added a new Article 173-1 which states that shareholders who hold more than half of the total number of shares and have held for more than three months are allowed to convene the provisional shareholders' meeting. This paper argues that this new provision has its traceable background which needs an update. Therefore, by comparing the relevant provisions in the US law and the Japanese law on the convening power and the convening power of the shareholders' meeting, this paper contends that although the new convening power of the shareholders' meeting of Article 173-1 of the Company Act is not a special and unique legislation, the proportion of shares has its distinctiveness. Hence, this paper asserts that the Article 173-1 of the Company Act is a shareholder activism with Taiwanese characteristics. |