戴維森論圖靈測試

Davidson on the Turing Test

圖靈提出以模仿遊戲來測試機器能否思想。戴維森論證這測試是無法決定受測對象之語意學，故而無法決定機器能否思想；但庫辛思基卻反駁戴維森的論證。針對此中爭論，本文首先勾勒並釐清戴維森對模仿遊戲所作之評述，然後展示他對圖靈測試之批評；其次是論證庫辛思基批評戴維森之理據或是不成立，或是奠基於其對戴維森哲學的誤解之上；最後則是展示戴維森有關思想之條件的觀點與AI的關係：對於我們可以如何修訂圖靈測試，以此判定受測對象是否具有思想，戴維森的看法可以給我們怎樣的啟發。

Davidson argues that the well-known Turing Test, being a method of determining whether a machine can think, fails to tell us anything about the semantics of the tested object and thus is inadequate to dis-cover whether can think or not. However, against Davidson, Kuczynski claims that his reasoning is entirely fallacious and has little force in at-tacking the Turing Test. In this paper I will first delineate and clarify Davidson’s comments on Turing’s imitation game and his reasons for reject it as a proper test of machine thinking. Second, I will object to Kuczynski’s criticisms by showing that his arguments are either ill-founded, inconclusive, or based on his misinterpretation of Davidson’s thought. Finally, I will show how Davidson proposes to modify the Test in accordance with his own theory of interpretation, and the signifi-cance of this modified version for the attribution of thought to AI.