價格競爭與停車場收費策略：以休閒遊憩產業為例

Price Competition and the Charge Strategies for Parking Lot: A Case of Recreational Tourism

本文探討在休閒遊憩產業中，兩家廠商提供同質的商品消費但可提供或不提供停車場，以及停車費可或不可抵才口商品消費價格的情況下，廠商的停車場收費策略對其商品價格，利潤水準，以及社會福利的影響效果。利用兩階段賽局為分析架構，在考量遊客對尋找停車位會產生掃興成本的假設下，發現廠商提供停車場並給予停車費抵扣(或不可抵扣)商品消費價格時，廠商間對停車費的不同處理策略會降低廠商在商品價格的競爭程度。換言之，不同的停車場收費策略是可以做為廠商服務差異化的策略，而這種策略降低了廠商之間的商品價格競爭;另外，從社會福利觀點來看，在廠商採取相同經學策略時，兩家廠商不提供停車場的經營策略對全體社會而言，是具經濟效率的經營策略，反而是廠商提供「免費」停車場的經營策略才是不具經濟效率的經營策略。

This paper investigates the case in which two firms provide a homogeneous product but have facilities with/without parking lot in recreational tourism. By considering whether the parking fee is used to compensate for the price of product consumption, the paper examines the effects of the parking lot charge strategies on the price of product, profit, and social welfare. We construct a two-stsge game model under the assumption of the tourist having displeasure costs by looking for a parking lot. It is found that when providing parking lot and allowing (or not allowing) the parking fee to compensate for product consumption, different treatment strategies in the parking fee between two firms can mitigate the degree of price competition. In other words, the different strageies of charging for parkung can be a source of product differentiation, which in turn loewrsthe profuct price competition betewwn two firms, Our principal result, from the social welfare perspective, indicates that when firms use identical business strategies without offering parking for tourists are economically efficient, when two firms use the identical business strategy. By contrast, it is not efficient firms to offer parking lots to tourists free.