市區汽車客運路線經營權開放制度之設計

Mechanism Design of Deregulation for the Route Franchise of Local Motor Carriers

國內多數市區汽車客運路線經營之權取得係採申請核准制，整套制度不夠周延完備，並無審議委員會的設置，且經營許可年限過長，市場缺少競爭者，加上缺少監督評鑑作業，難以約束客運服務品質。這種申請、補貼典監督分別辦理的制度存在諸多問題，且確實有必要予以檢討與革新，以健全市區汽車客運路線經營權開放之遊戲規則。因此，有別於其他相關研究與制度均從微觀角度思考經營權之開放，本研究擬依系統性分析方式，以巨觀角度全面思考整套開放制度。本研究目的在於建立一套適合開放制度之分析架構，以進行開放制度之設計，並研擬重要構成要件，以提供日後將開放制度付諸法令化之依據。

Most of local motor carriers' franchises are approved directly by local government without reviewing committees. This system was imperfect for its long concession periods, lack of competitors in the market and supervision in the monitoring process. The present practice, which separates application, subsidy and supervision, should be improved to conform the deregulation policy. Therefore, this study applies a systematic method to comprehensively explore the deregulation of motor carriers, and aims at establishing an appropriate system architecture for the mechanism design.