CEO Tenure and Earnings Management: The Role of Internal Governance

CEO任期與盈餘管理：併論內部治理的角色

本文以美國上市公司為樣本，探討公司主要的部屬主管是否具有動機和能力，抑制CEO在任期內不同階段之盈餘管理行為。本研究之實證結果與探討聯合運用裁決性應計數和實際盈餘管理達到盈餘門檻之美國主流文獻不同，發現企業同時運用該二盈餘管理工具以達到盈餘目標，以及盈餘管理略間之互補性。本文並發現CEO為了影響市場對其能力之肯定並保護其聲譽，會傾向在服務期間的第一年和最後一年運用盈餘管理策略使其淨利向上修正。本研究以距離退休之年數衡量主要部屬主管之動機，並以主要部屬主管之獎酬對CEO之獎酬所佔比例衡量部屬主管之影響，進而衡量公司內部治理機制，並發現當公司內部治理較強時，會抑制CEO在服務期間的第一年和最後一年運用裁決性應計數和真實盈餘管理使其淨利向上修正之盈餘管理行為。本文另以不同的樣本組合進行增額測試，以增強上述之研究結果之穩健性。

Using a sample of U.S. public firms, we examine whether key subordinate executives have the incentive and ability to constrain CEOs' earnings management behavior during their tenure as CEO. In contrast with the mainstream U.S. results in the literature concerning the potential for using discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation jointly to manage earnings, our results suggest that discretionary accruals and real activities manipulation are partial complements for earnings management, and that their magnitudes are determined simultaneously. We also document that CEOs have incentive to increase earnings in the early years and the final year of their service, presumably to favorably influence the market's perception of their ability as well as protect their reputation. Using the number of years to retirement and their compensation relative to the CEO's to capture subordinate executives' incentives and influence within the firm, respectively, we find that CEOs are less likely to use accrual-based earnings management and real activities manipulation to increase reported income in the early years and the final year of their service in firms with stronger internal monitoring. These results are robust to different sample specifications.