董事任期對資本支出的影響

The Impact of the Tenure of Directors Capital Expenditure

本研究以1998年至2018年台灣上市企業資本支出比率，討論企業投資效率，研究中我們使用公司特性、公司治理以及董事任期來討論此問題。實證結果發現董事長任期越長，企業資本支出比率越多，而且當董事長任期超過九年可以增加公司的投資效率，支持年長的董事長投資決策優於年輕的董事長。此外，本研究也發現董事任期越長，企業資本支出越少，而且當董事任期超過九年後降低企業投資效率，支持董事任期太長導致裙帶關係，最終造成董事會無法發揮監督功能。

This study discusses the efficiency of corporate investment in the capital expenditure ratio of listed companies in Taiwan from 1998 to 2018. In the study, we used company characteristics, corporate governance and directorship to discuss this issue. The empirical results show that the longer the term of the chairman, the more the capital outflow ratio of the company, and the more than nine years of the chairman's term can increase the company's investment efficiency, and support the older chairman's investment decision is better than the young chairman. In addition, the study also found that the longer the director's tenure, the less capital expenditure of the company, and the reduction of corporate investment efficiency after the director's term of office exceeds nine years. Supporting the long term of the directors leads to the nepotism, which ultimately results in the board of directors not being able to play the supervisory function.