有線電視新聞台的賽局競爭分析

The Analysis of Game Competition: Cable Television News Channel

本研究以賽局理論為分析基礎，訪談六家有線電視新聞台18位製作人、採訪中心與編輯主任，同時以兩天晚間新聞與廣告內容為討論範例。結果發現，由於共享收視率、參考報紙、人員互通與新聞監看等因素，各台能完全掌控彼此的訊息，為了不漏新聞，造成所有內容同質性高；長期競爭的均衡結果，晚間新聞的開播時間與廣告破口也趨於一致，以獲得最大的收視率報酬；而由於從業人員系出同門，對新聞價值觀念一致，認同影音畫面與戲劇張力的故事，就是共同選擇的優勢策略；因此，最後新聞內容的差異化，就只剩下編排rundown前後順序的不同而已。如果不能改變目前的互動規則與報酬，讓新聞台有誘因改變選擇其他策略的可能，則目前的社會困境仍將會持續。

Theoretically, competition increases the total social welfare; and more competitors in the supply side should be able to promote more efficiency and welfare. Among the multi-channel television industry in Taiwan, there are over hundreds of channels and eight 24-hours news channels. However, the reality indicated that more competitions between numerous news channels elicit worse performance, such as low production cost and less diversity. This paper specifically focuses on the dilemma of the prisoners in the game theory to explain the reasons of the news channels corporation could not select their dominant strategy but the dominated strategy in the Nash equilibrium. It suggests the academics and the government should try to modify the rule of the game, payoff and information set, in order to change the outcome of the dilemma among the cable television news channels.