衝突與融合：認罪認罰從寬制度的本土化

2019年底北京市兩級法院判決的“余金平交通肇事案”揭示出認罪認罰從寬制度全面施行後法院、檢察院之間的衝突。從表像上，這種衝突實質上是檢、法兩家對認罪認罰案件量刑主導權的爭奪。其根源在於立法態度曖昧不明，沒有明確區分兩種不同的“從寬”邏輯。立法者之所以不肯明確承認量刑協商，是因為看到了“協商”背後隱藏的系統性風險。在以調查模式和層級模式為建構原則的中國刑事訴訟框架下，“協商”承載的是與之不相容的糾紛模式和同位元模式的基本邏輯。因此，認罪認罰從寬制度存在進一步本土化的問題。對此有兩種處理方案，一是管控衝突的烈度，重新定位認罪認罰從寬制度的性質與功能，使之實現從“案件處理機制”到“案件查明機制”的轉型；二是管控衝突的範圍，為“協商”施加適用範圍上的限制。

Yu Jinping Case judged by two courts in Beijing in late 2019 revealed the conflict between the courts and the procuratorates after the full enforcement of the system of lenience on admission of guilt and acceptance of punishment. On the surface, the conflict comes from their fight for dominant authority in sentencing. But the fight for sentencing authority actually originates from the equivocal attitude of the legislature. Two different logics are not differentiated: the logic of negotiation and policy enforcing. Why the legislature declined to give a decent position to negotiation between the prosecution and the defense, is because they have seen the systematic risk behind negotiation. Against the basic framework of Chinese criminal justice characteristic of official investigation model and hierarchical model, negotiation reflects the incompatible logic of model of dispute and model of coordinate. The conflict between them has to be solved. There are two options: first, to redefine the nature and function of system of leniency on admitting guilt and accepting punishment, and to transform it from a case solving mechanism to a fact-finding mechanism; second, to control the scope of the conflict, and to impose limits on the applying scope of negotiation mechanism. But within the applying scope, to follow the logic of negotiation to solve the cases where the defendants admit guilt and accept punishment.