資產分割理論下的企業財產獨立性

資產分割理論與科斯定理一脈相承，從交易成本的角度解釋了企業財產獨立制度的經濟功能。這一理論已為我國學界所關注，但其中蘊含的規範性意義尚未被充分意識到。資產分割理論表明企業財產獨立制度同時產生社會成本與收益，法律有必要因時因地作相應的調整。同時，作為一項法經濟學理論，資產分割理論主要關注企業財產獨立制度的效率後果，而對其在公平維度上的效果探討不足。本文總結歸納了不同情況下資產分割的效率與公平效果的主要影響因素，並建立了一個理論框架，可以對是否以及如何限制企業財產獨立性提供指導。這一理論框架可以被運用於分析刺破與反向刺破公司面紗、關聯企業實質合併破產、“債隨物走規則”等法律問題。

The theory of asset partitioning, like the Coase theorem, focuses on the question of whether law matters in the allocation of property rights. By analyzing the transaction costs associated with property rights arrangements of enterprises, the theory of asset partitioning offers an explanation for the economic functions of enterprises law. Current studies have not fully recognized the normative implications of this theory: it suggests that respecting the separate property arrangements of the enterprise generates both social costs and benefits which need to be taken into account in the design of enterprise law. Meanwhile, as a law and economics theory, the theory of asset partitioning focuses almost entirely on efficiency but not equality. This article develops the current theory into a framework and identifies certain factors that may affect the costs and benefits of different property rights arrangements in enterprise law, which can be employed to analyze several issues in Chinese law, including the piercing and reverse piercing of corporate veil, substantive consolidation, and the rule of debt-follow-asset.